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Chapter 1
Overview
My dissertation is comprised of three studies that examine theoretically the relation
between asset bubbles and the macroeconomics, and that between bank competition and
the aggregate economy. All three essays are built on a dynamic general equilibrium frame-
work. The first two chapters focus on the aggregate impact of bubbles and crashes while
the third chapter investigates the role of competition in the financial sector.
The cause and consequences of asset bubbles have long been studied in the literature.
One influential strand is the rational bubbles theory, which considers asset bubbles as a
remedy of dynamic inefficiency. Yet, among these studies, little effort has been spent on
exploring how the labor decision responds to asset price boom and how the labor market
helps propagate the impact of asset market flucuation to the real economy, despite of ample
evidence indicating a close relation between the labor market and the asset bubbles. In
addition, the standard rational bubble theory predicts economic contraction when bubbles
emerge but the recent macroeconomic statistics show the opposite.
Responding to above concerns, chapter 2 employs an overlapping generations model
with endogenous labor supply to study the effects of asset bubbles. By allowing flexibility
1
2in labor supply, the model shows that bubbles can promote expansion in steady-state
capital, investment, employment and output as long as labor supply responds strongly and
positively to increase in interest rate. The new result helps to reconcile the inconsistency
between theory and the empirical finding.
Chapter 3 continues to investigate the implication of endogenous labor supply on the
role of asset bubbles but emphasizes the event of bubble crash. It develops a stochastic
environment to assume that the bubbles may randomly crash in any period after they are
formed. Comparing with the stochastic setup with no labor choice, our model generates
more realistic results in following aspects: the major economy in terms of the interest rate,
aggregate employment and total output experience an immediate drop when bubble burst,
while these variables won’t be affected in the model without labor choice. This is because in
the economy without labor choice, the only effective determinant of production is capital.
In the overlapping generations setting, current period’s capital is predetermined by saving
from last period. Thus if the bubbles crash, current capital stock won’t be affected, nor
will the interest rate or total output. On the other hand, when considering labor decision,
the output and interest rate are depended on both capital and labor. If bubbles burst,
even though capital level is predetermined and not subject to the change, labor supply
will be affected immediately by the crash, so are interest rate and total ouput. Moreover,
the second chapter finds that the stochastic bubbles can be expansionary to the economy
as well, for similar reason in the case of deterministic bubbles.
The main question Chapter 4 attempts to address is the implication of bank competi-
tion on saving and the deposit interest, capital accumulation, and the borrowing lending
activities. Recent studies have started to examine the macroeconomic effects of the in-
dustrial organization of the banking system, but these studies typically focus on two
3extreme cases: perfectly competitive banking system and monopoly banking system. A
less extreme market structure has not been thoroughly examined yet. On the other hand,
oligopoly banking system is prevalent in many economies, which stresses the importance
of investigating such particular market structure. The present study is intended to fill this
gap.
To achieve that, chapter 4 presents a dynamic general equilibrium model with banks
engaged in Cournot competition in the loan market as well as the deposit market. Lending
activities take place under asymmetric information and are subject to costly monitoring.
By affecting the deposit rate as well as the loan rate, the banks control the volume of saving
and borrowing, which jointly determine the capital level. In addition, due to the asym-
metric information problem, the monitoring intensity is positively associated with leverage
ratio. Therefore, when the financial market becomes less concentrated, a higher volume
of credits will be issued to entrepreneurs, leading to more capital investment. Meanwhile,
banks demand more active monitoring, which aggravates the inefficiency. Further analysis
has been done to examine how the severity of asymmetry, the share of entrepreneurs or
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution affect the capital accumulation. The results
show a negative, positive and mixing effect respectively.
Chapter 2
Asset Bubbles in an Overlapping Generations Model with
Endogenous Labor Supply
2.1 Introduction
The existence and consequences of asset bubbles have long been a subject of interest
to economists. In a seminal paper, Tirole (1985) showed that asset bubbles can exist in an
overlapping generations economy with rational consumers and exogenous labor supply. A
central implication of Tirole’s model is that asset bubbles will always crowd out investment
in productive capital and reduce capital accumulation. Since labor supply is inelastic, this
will also lead to a reduction in aggregate output. This negative relationship between
asset bubbles and aggregate economic activities, however, is in contrast with empirical
evidence. As pointed out by Martin and Ventura (2012), episodes of asset bubbles in the
U.S. and Japan are typically associated with periods of robust economic expansions. In
the present study, we show that this conflict between theory and evidence can be resolved
when labor supply is endogenous.1 More specifically, we show that asset bubbles can
1Olivier (2000), Farhi and Tirole (2012) and Martin and Ventura (2012) have explored other channels
through which asset bubbles can crowd in productive investment and foster economic growth in overlapping
4
5induce an expansion in steady-state capital, investment, employment and output if labor
supply responds strongly and positively to changes in interest rate. This type of response
is possible when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) in consumption is small
and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is large. The intuition of this result will be
explained later. We also provide a specific numerical example to illustrate our findings.
2.2 The Model
The model economy under study is essentially the one considered in Tirole (1985,
Section 2), except that labor supply is now endogenously determined. Specifically, consider
an overlapping generations model in which each consumer lives two periods: young and
old. In each period t ≥ 0, a new generation of identical consumers is born. The size of
generation t is given by Nt = (1 + n)
t , with n > 0. All consumers have one unit of time
endowment which can be allocated between work and leisure. Retirement is mandatory
in the second period of life, so the labor supply of old consumers is zero.
Consider a consumer who is born at time t ≥ 0. Let cy,t and co,t+1 denote his consump-
tion when young and old, respectively, and let lt denote his labor supply when young. The
consumer’s preferences are represented by
U (cy,t, lt, co,t+1) =
c1−σy,t
1− σ −A
l1+ψt
1 + ψ
+ β
c1−σo,t+1
1− σ , (2.1)
where σ > 0 is the inverse of the IES in consumption, ψ ≥ 0 is the inverse of the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply, β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor and A is a positive
constant. Let wt be the market wage rate at time t. Then the consumer’s labor income
when young is wtlt. The consumer can save in two types of assets: physical capital and
generations models. Miao and Wang (2012) have developed an infinite-horizon model in which asset
bubbles can promote total factor productivity. None of these studies have examined the connections
between endogenous labor supply and asset bubbles.
6an intrinsically worthless asset.2 The total supply of the intrinsically worthless asset is
constant over time and is denoted by M ≥ 0.3 Denote savings in the form of physical
capital by st, and savings in the form of intrinsically worthless asset by mt. The gross
return from physical capital between time t and t + 1 is given by Rt+1. The price of the
intrinsically worthless asset at time t is pt. No-arbitrage means that these two types of
assets must yield the same return in every period, so that Rt+1 = pt+1/pt for all t ≥ 0.
Taking {wt, pt, pt+1, Rt+1} as given, the consumer’s problem is to choose an allocation
{cy,t, lt, co,t+1, st,mt} so as to maximize his lifetime utility in (4.1), subject to the budget
constraints:
cy,t + st + ptmt = wtlt, and co,t+1 = Rt+1st + pt+1mt.
The first-order conditions for this problem are given by
wtc
−σ
y,t = Al
ψ
t , and c
−σ
y,t = βRt+1c
−σ
o,t+1. (2.2)
Using these equations, we can obtain
cy,t =
co,t+1
(βRt+1)
1
σ
=
wtlt
1 + β
1
σR
1
σ
−1
t+1
,
lt = A
− 1
σ+ψ
(
1 + β
1
σR
1
σ
−1
t+1
) σ
σ+ψ
w
1−σ
σ+ψ
t ,
st + ptmt = Σ (Rt+1)wtlt, where Σ (Rt+1) ≡
β
1
σR
1
σ
−1
t+1
1 + β
1
σR
1
σ
−1
t+1
. (2.3)
An increase in Rt+1 has two opposing effects on saving. These effects are captured by
the function Σ : R+ → [0, 1] defined in (4.3). First, an increase in Rt+1 means that for
2The second type of asset is called “intrinsically worthless” because it has no consumption value and
cannot be used for production. The only motivation for holding this type of asset is to resell it at a higher
price in the next period.
3At time 0, all assets are owned by a group of “initial-old” consumers. The decision problem of these
consumers is trivial and does not play any role in the following analysis.
7the same level of total savings, the consumer will receive more interest income when old.
This creates an income effect which encourages consumption when young and discour-
ages saving. Second, an increase in interest rate also lowers the relative price of future
consumption. This creates an intertemporal substitution effect which discourages con-
sumption when young and promotes saving. The relative strength of these two effects
depends on the value of σ. In particular, the intertemporal substitution effect dominates
when σ < 1. In this case, an increase in Rt+1 will always increase the savings rate so that
Σ (·) is a strictly increasing function. When σ > 1, the income effect dominates so that
Σ (·) is strictly decreasing. The two effects exactly cancel out when σ = 1. In this case,
Σ (·) is a constant.
On the supply side of the economy, there is a large number of identical firms. In each
period, each firm hires labor and physical capital from the competitive factor markets,
and produces output according to
Yt = K
α
t L
1−α
t , with α ∈ (0, 1) ,
where Yt denotes output produced at time t, Kt and Lt denote capital input and labor
input, respectively. Since the production function exhibits constant returns to scale, we
can focus on the choices made by a single price-taking firm. We assume that physical
capital is fully depreciated after one period, so that Rt coincides with the rental price of
physical capital at time t ≥ 0. The representative firm’s problem is given by
max
Kt,Lt
{
Kαt L
1−α
t −RtKt − wtLt
}
,
and the first-order conditions are Rt = αK
α−1
t L
1−α
t , and wt = (1− α)Kαt L−αt .
Given M ≥ 0, a competitive equilibrium of this economy consists of sequences of allo-
cations {cy,t, lt, co,t+1, st,mt}∞t=0 , aggregate inputs {Kt, Lt}∞t=0 , and prices {wt, pt, Rt}∞t=0
8such that (i) given {wt, pt, pt+1, Rt+1}, the allocation {cy,t, lt, co,t+1, st,mt} is optimal for
the consumers in generation t ≥ 0, (ii) given {wt, Rt}, the aggregate inputs {Kt, Lt} solve
the representative firm’s problem at time t ≥ 0, and (iii) all markets clear in every period,
so that Lt = Ntlt, Ntmt = M and
Kt+1 = Ntst =
 β 1σR 1σ−1t+1
1 + β
1
σR
1
σ
−1
t+1
wtlt − ptmt, for all t ≥ 0. (2.4)
Let kt ≡ Kt/Nt be the quantity of physical capital per worker at time t, and let at ≡
ptmt be the quantity of unproductive savings per young consumer. Then the equilibrium
wage rate can be expressed as wt = (1− α) kαt l−αt , and (4.4) can be rewritten as
(1 + n) kt+1 = (1− α)
 β 1σR 1σ−1t+1
1 + β
1
σR
1
σ
−1
t+1
(kt
lt
)α
lt − at. (2.5)
The dynamics of at is determined by
at+1 = pt+1mt+1 =
pt+1mt+1
ptmt
at =
Rt+1
1 + n
at.
2.3 Stationary Equilibrium
2.3.1 Economy without Intrinsically Worthless Assets
Before analyzing the effects of asset bubbles, we first characterize the stationary e-
quilibrium of an economy with zero supply of intrinsically worthless asset, i.e., M = 0
and at = 0 for all t ≥ 0. A stationary equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium in which
kt = k
∗, lt = l∗ and Rt = R∗ for all t ≥ 0. Substituting these conditions into (4.5) gives
β
1
σ (R∗)
1
σ
−1
1 + β
1
σ (R∗)
1
σ
−1
(
k∗
l∗
)α−1
=
1 + n
1− α
⇒ Λ (R∗) ≡ β
1
σ (R∗)
1
σ
1 + β
1
σ (R∗)
1
σ
−1 =
(1 + n)α
1− α . (2.6)
9Equation (4.6) follows from the fact that R∗ = α (k∗/l∗)α−1 . For any σ > 0, the function
Λ : R+ → R+ is strictly increasing with Λ (0) = 0 and lim
R→∞
Λ (R) =∞. Hence, there exists
a unique R∗ > 0 that solves (4.6). The steady-state value of all other variables can be
uniquely determined by
w∗ = (1− α)
( α
R∗
) α
1−α
, (2.7)
l∗ = A−
1
σ+ψ
[
1 + β
1
σ (R∗)
1
σ
−1
] σ
σ+ψ
(w∗)
1−σ
σ+ψ , (2.8)
k∗ = l∗
( α
R∗
) 1
1−α
, and c∗y =
c∗o
(βR∗)
1
σ
=
w∗l∗
1 + β
1
σ (R∗)
1
σ
−1 . (2.9)
This establishes the following result.
Proposition 2.3.1. A unique bubbleless steady state exists for any σ > 0. The steady-
state values{
R∗, w∗, k∗, l∗, c∗y, c∗o
}
are determined by (4.6)-(4.10).
2.3.2 Economy with Intrinsically Worthless Assets
Suppose now the economy has a strictly positive supply of intrinsically worthless assets,
i.e., M > 0. In the following analysis, we focus on stationary equilibria in which the price of
these assets exceeds their fundamental value, i.e., pt = p
∗ > 0. Formally, a “bubbly” steady
state is a set of values
{
a˜∗, R˜∗, w˜∗, k˜∗, l˜∗, c˜∗y, c˜∗o
}
that satisfies the following conditions:
a˜∗ > 0, R˜∗ = 1 + n,
a˜∗ + (1 + n) k˜∗ = (1− α)
 β 1σ
(
R˜∗
) 1
σ
−1
1 + β
1
σ
(
R˜∗
) 1
σ
−1
( k˜∗
l˜∗
)α
l˜∗, (2.10)
and (4.7)-(4.10).4 Substituting a˜∗ > 0 and R˜∗ = 1 + n into (4.11) gives
1 + n
1− α <
[
β
1
σ (1 + n)
1
σ
−1
1 + β
1
σ (1 + n)
1
σ
−1
](
k˜∗
l˜∗
)α−1
⇒ (1 + n)α
1− α < Λ (1 + n) . (2.11)
4Note that equations (4.7)-(4.10) must be satisfied in any steady state, regardless of the existence of
asset bubbles.
10
Since Λ (·) is strictly increasing, (4.6) and (4.8) together imply that R∗ < 1 + n. This
shows that R∗ < 1 + n is a necessary condition for the existence of bubbly steady state.
Suppose this condition is satisfied. Then substituting R˜∗ = 1 + n into (4.7)-(4.10) yields
a unique set of values for
{
w˜∗, k˜∗, l˜∗, c˜∗y, c˜∗o
}
. Using (4.11), we can obtain a unique value
of a∗, which is strictly positive as R∗ < 1 + n and Λ (·) is strictly increasing. Hence, a
unique bubbly steady state exists. This proves the following result.
Proposition 2.3.2. A unique bubbly steady state exists if and only if R∗ < 1 + n.
Similar to Tirole (1985), our model predicts that equilibrium interest rate will increase
in the presence of asset bubbles. When labor supply is exogenous, the steady-state value
of per-worker capital is determined by k∗ = (α/R∗)
1
1−α . Thus, a higher interest rate in the
bubbly steady state means that there is fewer per-worker capital than in the bubbleless
steady state, i.e., k˜∗ < k∗. When labor supply is endogenous, the value of k∗ is jointly
determined by l∗ and R∗ as shown in (4.10). If the existence of asset bubbles can induce
young consumers to work more (i.e., l˜∗ > l∗), and if this effect is strong enough to overcome
the increase in interest rate, then more capital will be accumulated in the bubbly steady
state than in the bubbleless one, i.e., k˜∗ > k∗. The rest of this paper is intended to formalize
this idea. Two remarks are in order before we proceed. First, the above description makes
clear that k˜∗ > k∗ can happen only if labor supply is adjustable. This highlights the
importance of introducing endogenous labor into Tirole’s model. Second, suppose l˜∗ > l∗
and k˜∗ > k∗ are true. Then per-worker output in the bubbly steady state must also be
higher than in the bubbleless steady state.
11
Suppose R∗ < 1 + n. Then using (4.7)-(4.10), which are valid in both bubbleless and
bubbly steady states, we can obtain
k∗ = (1− α) 1−σσ+ψ A− 1σ+ψ
[
1 + β
1
σ (R∗)
1
σ
−1
] σ
σ+ψ
( α
R∗
)φ
,
k˜∗ = (1− α) 1−σσ+ψ A− 1σ+ψ
[
1 + β
1
σ (1 + n)
1
σ
−1
] σ
σ+ψ
(
α
1 + n
)φ
,
where φ ≡ 11−α
[
1 + α(1−σ)σ+ψ
]
> 0 for any σ > 0. Hence, k˜∗ > k∗ if and only if
[
1 + β
1
σ (1 + n)
1
σ
−1
] σ
σ+ψ
(
α
1 + n
)φ
>
[
1 + β
1
σ (R∗)
1
σ
−1
] σ
σ+ψ
( α
R∗
)φ
⇔
(
R∗
1 + n
)φ
>
[
1 + β
1
σ (R∗)
1
σ
−1
1 + β
1
σ (1 + n)
1
σ
−1
] σ
σ+ψ
. (2.12)
Note that this condition cannot be satisfied if σ ≥ 1. Since R∗ < 1+n, we have (R∗) 1σ−1 ≥
(1 + n)
1
σ
−1 , whenever σ ≥ 1. Condition (4.2) then implies
(
R∗
1 + n
)φ
>
[
1 + β
1
σ (R∗)
1
σ
−1
1 + β
1
σ (1 + n)
1
σ
−1
] σ
σ+ψ
≥ 1,
which contradicts R∗ < 1 + n. Thus, a necessary condition for k˜∗ > k∗ is σ < 1. The
intuition underlying this result is straightforward: In the presence of asset bubbles, equi-
librium interest rate rises from R∗ to R˜∗ = 1 + n. Such an increase will create an income
effect and an intertemporal substitution effect on the young’s consumption. Since con-
sumption and labor supply is inversely related, the income effect will discourage young
consumers from working, whereas the intertemporal substitution effect will induce them
to work more.5 Since k˜∗ > k∗ can happen only if l˜∗ > l∗, it is necessary to have the
intertemporal substitution effect dominates the income effect, i.e., σ < 1.6
5The inverse relationship between cy,t and lt can be seen by combining the first-order condition wtc
−σ
y,t =
Alψt with the expression for the equilibrium wage rate wt = (1− α) (kt/lt)α .
6In infinite-horizon models, it is typical to assume that σ is greater than or equal to one. However, in
overlapping generations model, it is typical to assume that the intertemporal substitution effect is greater
than the income effect. Galor and Ryder (1989) shows that this assumption plays an important role in
establishing the existence, uniqueness and stability of both stationary and non-stationary equilibria in
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We now derive a sufficient condition for k˜∗ > k∗. Suppose R∗ < 1 + n and σ < 1 are
satisfied. Using (4.6), we can get
1 + β
1
σ (R∗)
1
σ
−1 =
(1− α)β 1σ (R∗) 1σ
α (1 + n)
.
Substituting this into (4.2) and rearranging terms gives
(
R∗
1 + n
)φ(σ+ψ)−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Υ
> (1 + n)1−σ
 (1− α)β
1
σ
α
[
1 + β
1
σ (1 + n)
1
σ
−1
]

σ
, (2.13)
where φ (σ + ψ)−1 = ψ+α1−α − (1− σ) . Note that the parameter ψ does not affect the value
of R∗ nor the expression on the right-hand side of (4.13). Since R∗ < 1 + n, lowering the
value of ψ will raise the value of Υ. Thus, holding other parameters constant, k˜∗ > k∗ is
more likely to occur when the value of ψ is low (i.e., close to zero). A low value of ψ means
that the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is large. This, together with σ < 1, ensures that
young consumers will significantly increase their labor supply when interest rate rises. A
low value of ψ is not uncommon in macroeconomic studies. In the extreme case when
ψ = 0, the preferences in (4.1) become quasi-linear in labor. Hansen (1985) shows that
this type of utility function can arise in a model with indivisible labor. Quasi-linear utility
function is now commonly used in business cycle models and monetary-search models.
The main results of this paper are summarized in Proposition 3.7
Proposition 2.3.3. (i) Suppose R∗ < 1 + n. Then a necessary condition for k˜∗ > k∗ is
σ < 1. (ii) Suppose R∗ < 1 +n and σ < 1 are satisfied. Then k˜∗ > k∗ if (4.13) is satisfied.
an overlapping generations model with exogenous labor supply. Nourry (2001) uses similar conditions to
examine the local stability of stationary equilibria in a model with endogenous labor supply. In a well-
known study on stochastic bubbles, Weil (1987) focuses on the case when the interest elasticity of savings
is positive. Under a constant-relative-risk-aversion utility function, this assumption is equivalent to σ < 1.
There is also some empirical support for σ < 1. See, for instance, the results in Table III and Table IV of
Gourinchas and Parker (2002).
7Following Tirole (1985) and Weil (1987), we state our main results in terms of R∗, which is an endoge-
nous variable. In the next subsection, we provide a set of parameter values under which the conditions in
Proposition 3 are satisfied.
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2.3.3 Numerical Example
We now provide a specific numerical example to illustrate the results in Proposition 3.
Suppose one model period takes 30 years. Set the annual subjective discount rate to 0.9950
and the annual employment growth rate to 1.6%.8 Then we have β = (0.9950)30 =
0.8604 and n = (1.0160)30 − 1 = 0.6099. We also set α = 0.30 and ψ = 0. The value
of A is calibrated so that l∗ is about one-third. Under this calibration procedure, k˜∗ is
greater than k∗ for any σ ∈ [0, 0.16] . In Table 1, we report the results obtained under
σ = 0.15 and A = 0.5862. Under these parameter values, the bubbly steady state has a
higher level of employment, per-worker capital and per-worker output than the bubbleless
steady state.9
Table 1: Numerical Results
Bubbleless Steady State Bubbly Steady State
R 1.2416 1.6099
k 0.0438 0.0461
a 0 0.0721
l 0.3333 0.5084
w 0.3808 0.3407
y 0.1813 0.2474
Note: The notation y denotes per-worker capital, i.e., y = kαl1−α.
8The latter coincides with the average annual growth rate of employed workers (over age 16) in the
United States over the period 1953-2008.
9Similar results can be obtained for other values of {α, β, n} and some non-zero values of ψ. In general,
one can extend the range of σ under which k˜∗ > k∗ by either raising the value of β or lowering the value
of α. On the other hand, changing the value of A has no effect on the relative magnitude between k˜∗ and
k∗.
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2.4 Conclusions
In this paper, we show that a simple modification of the Tirole (1985) model can
lead to a drastically different conclusion. Specifically, we show that when labor supply
is elastic, deterministic rational bubbles can induce an expansion in aggregate economic
activities under certain conditions. In the present study, specific forms of utility function
and production function have been used . This allows us to deliver our main results in
a clear and concise manner. One direction for future research is to extend our results
to general utility functions and production technologies. Another possibility is to extend
the model to allow for financial market frictions and agency costs as in Azariadis and
Chakraborty (1998).
Chapter 3
The Macroeconomic Consequences of Asset Bubbles and
Crashes
3.1 Introduction
In this paper, we present a stylized model of asset bubbles and crashes, and analyze
the effects of these phenomena on the macroeconomy. The model is an extended version
of the stochastic bubble model in Weil (1987) that takes into account the effects of asset
bubbles on labor supply decisions. Using this model, we demonstrate how labor market
responses to asset price fluctuations can help propagate the effects of bubbles and crashes
to the aggregate economy.
Since the seminal work of Tirole (1985), it has been known that asset price bubbles —
defined as substantial positive deviations of an asset’s market price from its fundamental
value — can emerge and grow indefinitely in an overlapping generations (OLG) economy.
Weil (1987) generalizes the main results in this study to an environment in which asset
bubbles may randomly crash in any period. These studies provide an important concep-
tual framework for understanding the effects of bubbles and crashes, based on rational
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expectations and general equilibrium analysis. There are, however, two features of these
models that are at odd with empirical evidence. First, both Tirole (1985) and Weil (1987)
assume that labor supply is exogenously given. Thus, the implicit assumption is that labor
market variables, such as total employment and aggregate labor hours, are unrelated to
and unaffected by fluctuations in asset prices. This assumption is at odd with the obser-
vation that total employment and aggregate labor hours tend to move closely with asset
prices in the actual data. In particular, the bursting of asset bubbles is often followed by a
noticeable decline in these labor market variables (see Section 2 for details). Second, both
studies suggest that the formation of asset bubbles will crowd out investment in physical
capital and impede economic growth, while the bursting of these bubbles will have the
opposite effects. These predictions are also difficult to reconcile with empirical evidence.
For instance, private nonresidential fixed investment in the U.S. has increased significantly
during the formation of the internet bubble in the 1990s and the formation of the housing
bubble in the 2000s, and has dropped markedly when these bubbles burst. Chirinko and
Schaller (2001, 2011) and Gan (2007) provide formal empirical evidence showing that asset
bubbles have positive effects on private investment in the U.S. and Japan. Martin and
Ventura (2012) also observe that asset bubbles in these countries are often associated with
robust economic growth.
In a previous study (Shi and Suen, 2014), we show that these conflicts between theory
and evidence can potentially be resolved by relaxing the assumption of exogenous labor
supply. More specifically, we show that when labor supply is endogenously determined
in Tirole’s (1985) model, asset bubbles can potentially lead to an expansion in steady-
state capital, investment, employment and output. This happens when the inverse of
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) for consumption is small and the Frisch
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elasticity of labor supply is large, so that individual labor supply will respond strongly
and positively to changes in interest rate. This result highlights the importance of labor
supply decisions in analyzing the effects of asset bubbles. This study, however, does not
take into account one salient feature of asset bubbles, namely that they will crash at
some point but the timing of this cannot be predicted with certainty. Allowing for bubble
crashes is important for the issue at hand because, as history attests, these incidents can
often lead to great disturbances in the aggregate economy. Motivated by this, the present
study extends the analysis in Shi and Suen (2014) to the case of stochastic bubbles and
explores the circumstances under which our model can account for the empirical evidence
mentioned above.
Similar to our prior work, we consider a two-period OLG model in which consumers
can choose how much time to work, and how much to save and consume in their first period
of life. There are two types of assets in this economy: physical capital and an intrinsically
worthless asset. The latter is similar in nature to fiat money and unbacked government
debt. Asset bubble is said to occur when this type of asset is traded across generations at
a positive price. The main point of departure from our previous study is the assumption
that asset bubbles may randomly crash as in the model of Weil (1987).1 A crash in
this context refers to the situation in which the price of the intrinsically worthless asset
falls abruptly and unexpectedly to its fundamental value which is zero. The prospect of
this happening means that investment in asset bubbles is subject to considerable risks.
A key question is whether this type of risk will spawn uncertainty at the aggregate level.
We show that the answer to this question depends crucially on the endogeneity of labor
supply. To see this, suppose an asset bubble exists in the current period and it will either
1This type of stochastic bubble is also considered in Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006), Farhi and
Tirole (2012, Section 4.2) and Ventura (2012, Section 3.3).
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survive or crash in the next period. Whether this type of uncertainty will affect the
aggregate economy depends on the effects of asset bubbles on the inputs of production.
Since the next-period stock of capital is determined by the savings in the current period,
it is unaffected by the future state of the bubble. If labor supply is exogenous as in Weil’s
(1987) model, then both capital and labor inputs (as well as their marginal products
and aggregate output) are independent of the state of the bubble. Thus, the bursting of
asset bubble will have no immediate impact on aggregate quantities and factor prices, and
the risky investment in asset bubbles will not generate aggregate uncertainty.2 This
implication of Weil’s model is no longer valid once we allow for an endogenous labor
supply. In this case, individual labor hours will in general depend on the state of the
asset bubble. As a result, the uncertain prospect of the bubble will create uncertainty in
future labor inputs and future prices, which will in turn affect consumers’ choices in the
current period. This provides a simple and intuitive mechanism through which bubbles
and crashes can affect the wider economy. The present study provides the first attempt
to analyze this mechanism in a rational bubble model. The main results of this paper are
largely in line with those obtained from our previous work. Specifically, we show that the
existence of stochastic bubbles can potentially crowd in productive investment, but this
happens only if the bubbles can induce a significant expansion in labor supply. Again this
scenario is likely to occur when the inverse of the IES for consumption is small and the
Frisch elasticity of labor supply is large.
Several recent studies have explored other channels through which asset bubbles can
crowd in productive investment and foster economic growth using OLG models. For
instance, Martin and Ventura (2012) and Ventura (2012) present models in which asset
2In the present study, the factor markets are assumed to be competitive so that factor prices (i.e., the
rental price of capital and wage rate) are determined by the marginal products of capital and labor.
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bubbles can improve investment efficiency by shifting resources from less productive firms
or countries to more productive ones. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006) and Farhi and
Tirole (2012) develop models in which asset bubbles can facilitate investment by providing
liquidity to financially constrained firms. These existing studies, however, choose to adopt
some strongly simplifying assumptions on consumer preferences which thwart both the
intertemporal substitution in consumption and the intratemporal substitution between
consumption and labor.3 The present study complements the existing literature by
showing that these forces are important for understanding the macroeconomic impact of
bubbles and crashes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides evidence showing
that total employment, aggregate labor hours and private investment tend to move closely
with asset prices during episodes of asset bubbles. Section 3 describes the structure of the
model. Section 4 defines the equilibrium concepts and investigates the main properties of
the model. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Recent Cases of Asset Bubbles in the U.S.
In this section, we use the two most recent episodes of asset bubbles in the United
States as examples to show that total employment, aggregate labor hours and private
investment tend to move closely with asset prices during the course of these episodes. The
first case that we consider is the “internet bubble” or “dot-com bubble” which formed
during the second half of the 1990s. The second one is the housing price bubble which
formed during the first half of the 2000s. Figure 1 shows the monthly data of the Dow
3In addition to an exogenous labor supply, these studies also assume that consumers (or investors) are
risk neutral and only care about their consumption at the old age. Thus, the consumers will save all their
income when young which is completely determined by the wage rate.
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Jones Industrial Average and the Standard & Poor’s 500 index between January 1995
and December 2003. Unless otherwise stated, all the data reported in this section were
obtained from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) website. Both the Dow Jones
index and the S&P 500 have tripled between January 1995 and January 2000, and have
dropped significantly afterward. Ofek and Richardson (2002) and LeRoy (2004) provide
detailed account on why the surge in stock prices between 1995 and 2000 cannot be
explained by the growth in fundamentals (e.g., corporate earnings and dividends), and
thus suggest the existence of an asset bubble. Figure 2 shows the monthly data of the
Case-Shiller 20-City Home Price Index between June 2003 and June 2010. From June
2003 to June 2006, this index has increased by 46 percent. According to Shiller (2007)
and other subsequent studies, this surge in home prices represents a substantial deviation
from the fundamentals (e.g., rent and construction costs) and is thus generally regarded
as a bubble.
The next three diagrams show the relationship between stock prices, employment and
private nonresidential fixed investment during the internet bubble episode. Figure 3 shows
the monthly data of total employment between January 1995 and December 2003, and
compares it to the Dow Jones index. Total employment refers to the total number of
employees in all private industries in the Current Employment Statistics (CES) data.
Figure 4 shows the monthly data of the aggregate weekly hours index in the CES data
over the same time period.4 These two diagrams show that total employment and
aggregate labor hours have moved closely with stock prices during the internet bubble
episode. Between January 1995 and January 2000, both total employment and aggregate
4The scale of these diagrams has been adjusted so as to highlight the timing of the rise and fall of these
variables. This is necessary because otherwise the threefold increase in the Dow Jones index will dwarf
the changes of employment in these diagrams.
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labor hours have increased by 13 percent, which is equivalent to an average annual growth
rate of 2.6 percent. This is significantly higher than the average annual growth rate of
total employment between 1948 and 2013, which was 1.3 percent. The average annual
growth rate of the aggregate hours index between 1964 and 2013 was 1.5 percent.5
Figures 3 and 4 also show a noticeable decline in aggregate labor input after the bursting
of the internet bubble. Figure 5 shows the quarterly data of private nonresidential fixed
investment (deflated by the GDP deflator) between 1995Q1 and 2003Q4. These data
were obtained from the National Income and Product Accounts. Between 1995Q1 and
2000Q1, real nonresidential investment has increased by 41 percent which is equivalent to
an average annual growth rate of 7.1 percent. As a point of reference, the average annual
growth rate of the same variable between 1948 and 2012 was 3.5 percent.
Next, we turn to the relationship between home prices, employment and private non-
residential fixed investment during the housing price bubble episode. Figures 6 and 7 show
the monthly data of total employment and aggregate labor hours between June 2003 and
June 2010, and compare them to the Case-Shiller index. Between June 2003 and June
2006, total employment has increased by 5.3 percent while aggregate labor hours have
increased by 7 percent. These are equivalent to an average annual growth rate of 1.7 per-
cent and 2.4 percent, respectively, which are again higher than their long-term averages.
Figure 8 shows the Case-Shiller index and private nonresidential fixed investment during
the period 2003Q3 to 2010Q3. The starting value of these time series have been normal-
ized to one so that the two are directly comparable. Between 2003Q3 and 2006Q3, real
nonresidential investment has increased by 18 percent, which is equivalent to an average
5Data on this index are only available from January 1964 onward.
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annual growth rate of 5.6 percent. This is again significantly higher than the average
annual growth rate between 1948 and 2012.
To summarize, total employment and aggregate labor hours (and also private invest-
ment) have moved closely with asset prices during the two most recent cases of asset
bubbles in the United States. This provides a direct justification for endogenizing labor
supply in the rational bubble model.
3.3 The Model
3.3.1 The Environment
Consider an economy inhabited by an infinite sequence of overlapping generations. In
each period t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...}, a new generation of identical consumers is born. The size of
generation t is given by Nt = (1 + n)
t , with n > 0. Each consumer lives two periods, which
we will refer to as the young age and the old age. In each period, each consumer has one
unit of time which can be allocated between work and leisure. Retirement is mandatory in
the old age, so the labor supply of old consumers is zero. Young consumers, on the other
hand, can choose how much time to work, and how much to save and consume. There
is a single commodity in this economy which can be used for consumption and capital
accumulation. All prices are expressed in units of this commodity.
Consider a consumer who is born at time t ≥ 0. Let cy,t and co,t+1 denote his consump-
tion when young and old, respectively; and let lt denote his labor supply when young. The
consumer’s expected lifetime utility is given by
Et
[
c1−σy,t
1− σ −A
l1+ψt
1 + ψ
+ β
c1−σo,t+1
1− σ
]
, (3.1)
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where σ > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the inverse of the IES for
consumption, ψ ≥ 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, β ∈ (0, 1)
is the subjective discount factor, and A is a positive constant.6 The consumer can
invest in two types of assets: the first one is physical capital and the second one is an
intrinsically worthless asset. The latter is called “intrinsically worthless” because it has
no consumption value and it cannot be used for production. The only motivation for
holding this asset is to resell it at a higher price in the next period. The total supply of
the intrinsically worthless asset is fixed and is denoted by M > 0.7
Let p˜t ≥ 0 be the price of the intrinsically worthless asset in period t, which is a
random variable. Since the fundamental value of this asset is zero, a strictly positive p˜t
signifies an overvaluation in period t, which we will refer to as an asset bubble. Following
Weil (1987), we assume that p˜t can be separated into a purely random component εt and
a purely deterministic component pt, so that p˜t ≡ εtpt for all t. The random component,
or asset price shock, is assumed to follow a Markov chain with two possible states {0, 1} ,
transition probabilities
Pr {εt+1 = 1|εt = 1} = q ∈ (0, 1) ,
Pr {εt+1 = 0|εt = 0} = 1,
and initial value ε0 = 1. The asset price shock is the only source of uncertainty in this
economy. The time path of the deterministic component, {pt}∞t=0 , is endogenously deter-
mined in equilibrium. At the beginning of each period t, the value of εt is revealed and
publicly observed. Suppose εt = 1 and pt > 0 so that an asset bubble exists in period t.
Then, with probability q, the price of the intrinsically worthless asset will remain on the
6If A = 0, then all consumers will supply one unit of labor inelastically when young. In this case, our
model is essentially identical to the production economy in Weil (1987).
7At time 0, all assets are owned by a group of “initial-old” consumers. The decision problem of these
consumers is trivial and does not play any role in the following analysis.
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deterministic time path in period t+ 1 (i.e., p˜t+1 = pt+1), and with probability (1− q) , it
will drop to zero in period t+ 1. One can think of the latter case as the result of a sudden,
unanticipated change in market sentiment which triggers a crash in the financial market.
The parameter q can be interpreted as the persistence of asset bubbles.8 Since the
probability of moving from εt = 1 to εt+1 = 0 is strictly positive in every period t, every
asset bubble is destined to crash in the long run (technically, this means p˜t will converge in
probability to zero as t tends to infinity). The timing of the crash, however, is uncertain.
Figure 9 shows the probability tree diagram for the asset price shock. The dark line in the
diagram traces the time path of εt before the crash. We will refer to this as the pre-crash
economy and the other parts of the diagram as the post-crash economy. Once the bubble
bursts, the asset price p˜t will remain zero from that point on. Hence, there is no incentive
for the consumers to hold the intrinsically worthless asset in the post-crash economy.
3.3.2 Consumer’s Problem
In this section, we will analyze the consumer’s problem before and after the crash.
To distinguish between these two scenarios, we use a hat (ˆ) to indicate variables in the
post-crash economy. First, consider the case when εt = 0. A young consumer at time t
now faces a deterministic problem, which is given by
max
ĉy,t,ŝt,l̂t,ĉo,t+1
[
ĉ1−σy,t
1− σ −A
l̂1+ψt
1 + ψ
+ β
ĉ1−σo,t+1
1− σ
]
subject to the budget constraints:
ĉy,t + ŝt = ŵt l̂t, and ĉo,t+1 = R̂t+1ŝt,
8The deterministic model considered in Shi and Suen (2014) can be considered as a special case of this
model with q = 1. In this case, an asset bubble will last forever.
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where ŝt denotes savings in physical capital, ŵt is the market wage rate, and R̂t+1 is the
gross return from physical capital between time t and t+ 1. The solution of this problem
is characterized by
ĉy,t =
(
βR̂t+1
)− 1
σ
ĉo,t+1 =
ŵt l̂t
1 + β
1
σ
(
R̂t+1
) 1
σ
−1 , (3.2)
l̂t = A
− 1
σ+ψ
[
1 + β
1
σ
(
R̂t+1
) 1
σ
−1] σσ+ψ
ŵ
1−σ
σ+ψ
t , (3.3)
ŝt = Σ
(
R̂t+1
)
ŵt l̂t, where Σ
(
R̂t+1
)
≡
β
1
σ
(
R̂t+1
) 1
σ
−1
1 + β
1
σ
(
R̂t+1
) 1
σ
−1 . (3.4)
The function Σ : R+ → [0, 1] defined in (4.5) summarizes the effects of interest rate
on savings. First, a higher interest rate means that with the same amount of savings in
the young age, there will be more interest income when old. This creates an income effect
which encourages consumption when young and discourages saving. Second, an increase in
interest rate also lowers the price of future consumption relative to current consumption.
This creates an intertemporal substitution effect which discourages consumption when
young and promotes saving. The relative strength of these two effects is determined by
the value of σ. In particular, the intertemporal substitution effect dominates when σ < 1.
In this case, Σ (·) is a strictly increasing function. When σ > 1, the income effect dominates
so that Σ (·) is strictly decreasing. The two effects exactly cancel out when σ = 1. In
this case, Σ (·) is a positive constant which means the consumer will save (and consume)
a constant fraction of his labor income when young.
Next, consider the case when εt = 1. Let mt be the consumer’s demand for the intrin-
sically worthless asset at time t. The consumer now faces the following budget constraint
in the young age
cy,t + st + ptmt = wtlt. (3.5)
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The gross return from physical capital between time t and t+ 1 is now a random variable,
which means its value depends on the realization of εt+1 (except under some special cases
which we will discuss below). Let Rt+1 be the value when εt+1 = 1, and R̂t+1 be the value
when εt+1 = 0. The consumer’s old-age consumption is now given by
co,t+1 =

Rt+1st + pt+1mt with probability q,
R̂t+1st with probability 1− q.
(3.6)
Taking
{
wt, pt, pt+1, Rt+1, R̂t+1
}
as given, the consumer’s problem is to choose an
allocation {cy,t, st, lt, mt, co,t+1} so as to maximize his expected lifetime utility in (4.1),
subject to the budget constraints in (4.6) and (4.7), and the non-negativity constraint:
mt ≥ 0.9 The first-order conditions regarding st and lt are given by
c−σy,t = β
[
qRt+1 (Rt+1st + pt+1mt)
−σ + (1− q) R̂t+1
(
R̂t+1st
)−σ]
, (3.7)
wtc
−σ
y,t = Al
ψ
t . (3.8)
Equation (4.9) is the standard Euler equation for consumption in the presence of aggregate
uncertainty. Equation (4.10) is the optimality condition for labor supply. Conditional on
εt = 1, the optimal choice of mt is determined by
ptc
−σ
y,t ≥ βEt
[
p˜t+1 (co,t+1)
−σ] = βqpt+1 (Rt+1st + pt+1mt)−σ , (3.9)
with equality holds in the first part if mt > 0. This equation states that if the marginal cost
of holding the intrinsically worthless asset (which is ptc
−σ
y,t ) is greater than the marginal
benefit of doing so (which is βEt
[
p˜t+1 (co,t+1)
−σ]), then the consumer will choose to have
9Given a constant-relative-risk-aversion (CRRA) utility function, it is never optimal for the consumer
to choose cy,t = 0 or co,t+1 = 0, regardless of the existence of asset bubble. Hence, the non-negativity
constraint for these variables is never binding. It is also never optimal to have st ≤ 0 and lt = 0. Suppose
the contrary that st ≤ 0, then the consumer will end up having co,t+1 ≤ 0 when εt+1 = 0, which cannot
be optimal. This, together with mt ≥ 0, means that consumers will never borrow. Finally, since labor
income is the only source of income during the consumer’s lifetime, it is never optimal to choose lt = 0.
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mt = 0. Equation (3.9) can be rewritten as
⇒ pt ≥ Et
[
β
(
co,t+1
cy,t
)−σ
p˜t+1
]
,
which is the standard consumption-based asset pricing equation.
We now explore the conditions under which the optimal choice of mt is strictly positive.
Consider a young consumer who initially chooses mt = 0. Suppose now he is considering
increasing it to ξ/pt > 0, where ξ > 0 is infinitesimal. In order to balance his budget,
the consumer will simultaneously reduce st by ξ. Define pit+1 ≡ pt+1/pt which is the
gross return from the intrinsically worthless asset conditional on εt+1 = 1. Increasing mt
from zero to ξ/pt will generate an expected return of qpit+1ξ, which will in turn increase
expected future utility by qpit+1 (Rt+1st)
−σ ξ. At the same time, the reduction in st will
lower expected future utility by
[
qRt+1 (Rt+1st)
−σ + (1− q) R̂t+1
(
R̂t+1st
)−σ]
ξ. (3.10)
Such an increase in mt is desirable if and only if the marginal benefit of doing so outweighs
the marginal cost, i.e.,
qpit+1 (Rt+1st)
−σ ξ >
[
qRt+1 (Rt+1st)
−σ + (1− q) R̂t+1
(
R̂t+1st
)−σ]
ξ.
This can be simplified to
qpit+1 >
q + (1− q)(R̂t+1
Rt+1
)1−σRt+1. (3.11)
This means the consumer is willing to hold the intrinsically worthless asset if and only if
the expected return qpit+1 exceeds a certain threshold. The threshold level is determined
by three factors: (i) the persistence of asset bubble q; (ii) the state-dependent returns
from physical capital Rt+1 and R̂t+1; and (iii) the preference parameter σ. If the gross
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return from physical capital is not state-dependent, i.e., Rt+1 = R̂t+1, then the condition
in (4.12) can be simplified to qpit+1 > Rt+1. If the utility function for consumption is
logarithmic, i.e., σ = 1, then the expression in (3.10) can be simplified to s−1t ξ. In this
case, both the marginal benefit and the marginal cost of increasing mt are independent of
R̂t+1, and the condition in (4.12) can again be simplified to become qpit+1 > Rt+1.
Suppose the condition in (4.12) is valid. Then the optimal investment in the intrinsi-
cally worthless asset, denoted by at ≡ ptmt, is given by
at ≡ ptmt = pt
pt+1
(
Ωt+1R̂t+1 −Rt+1
)
st, (3.12)
where
Ωt+1 ≡
[
q (pit+1 −Rt+1)
(1− q) R̂t+1
] 1
σ
.
It is straightforward to show that Ωt+1R̂t+1 > Rt+1 is equivalent to (4.12). Further details
of the consumer’s problem in the pre-crash economy can be found in Appendix A.
3.3.3 Production
On the supply side of the economy, there are a large number of identical firms. In each
period, each firm hires labor and physical capital from the competitive factor markets,
and produces output according to a Cobb-Douglas production function
Yt = K
α
t L
1−α
t , with α ∈ (0, 1) ,
where Yt denotes output produced at time t, Kt and Lt denote capital input and labor
input, respectively. Since the production function exhibits constant returns to scale, we
can focus on the problem faced by a single price-taking firm. We assume that physical
capital is fully depreciated after one period, so that Rt coincides with the rental price of
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physical capital at time t ≥ 0. The representative firm’s problem is given by
max
Kt,Lt
{
Kαt L
1−α
t −RtKt − wtLt
}
,
and the first-order conditions are
Rt = αK
α−1
t L
1−α
t and wt = (1− α)Kαt L−αt . (3.13)
Note that neither the production function nor the representative firm’s problem is directly
affected by the asset price shock, so the above equations are valid both before and after
the asset bubble crashes.10
3.4 Equilibria
In this section, we will define and characterize an equilibrium in which the intrinsically
worthless asset is valued at some point in time, i.e., p˜t > 0 for some t. We will refer to
this as a bubbly equilibrium. Such an equilibrium will have to take into account the
stochastic timing of the crash, and specify the conditions under which the economy is in
equilibrium both before and after the crash. One crucial element of a bubbly equilibrium
is the interactions between the pre-crash and the post-crash economies. First, given the
chronological order of events, the equilibrium outcomes in the pre-crash economy will
determine the initial state (more specifically, the initial value of physical capital) of the
post-crash economy. Second, when consumers are making their decisions before the crash,
say at some time t, the anticipated value of R̂t+1 will have to be consistent with an
equilibrium in the post-crash economy at time t + 1. In other words, the equilibrium
quantities and prices in the post-crash economy will also affect the equilibrium outcomes
prior the crash.11
10In the post-crash economy, all the variables in the above equations will be decorated with a hat.
11For reasons that we will discuss below, the second type of interaction is not present in Weil’s (1987)
model.
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3.4.1 Bubbleless Equilibrium
Suppose the crash happens at time T > 0, i.e., εT−1 = 1 and εT = 0. Then the
economy is free of asset bubbles from time T onward. Given an initial value K̂T > 0, a
post-crash bubbleless equilibrium consists of sequences of allocation
{
ĉy,t, ŝt, l̂t,ĉo,t
}∞
t=T
,
aggregate inputs
{
K̂t, L̂t
}∞
t=T
, and prices
{
ŵt, R̂t
}∞
t=T
such that for all t ≥ T, (i) the
allocation
{
ĉy,t, ŝt, l̂t,ĉo,t+1
}
solves the consumer’s problem at time t given ŵt and R̂t+1;
(ii) the consumption of old consumers at time T is determined by
NT−1ĉo,T = R̂T K̂T ;
(iii) the aggregate inputs
{
K̂t, L̂t
}
solve the representative firm’s problem at time t given
ŵt and R̂t; and (iv) all markets clear at time t, i.e., L̂t = Nt l̂t and K̂t+1 = Ntŝt.
Define k̂t ≡ K̂t/Nt. Then the equilibrium dynamics of k̂t and R̂t are determined by12
k̂t+1 =
1− α
α (1 + n)
 β 1σ
(
R̂t+1
) 1
σ
−1
1 + β
1
σ
(
R̂t+1
) 1
σ
−1
 R̂tk̂t, (3.14)
R̂ηt k̂t = α
η
[
(1− α)1−σ
A
] 1
σ+ψ [
1 + β
1
σ
(
R̂t+1
) 1
σ
−1] σσ+ψ
, (3.15)
where η ≡ 11−α + α1−α 1−σσ+ψ > 0. The initial value k̂T = K̂T /NT is given. Once the equilib-
rium time path of k̂t and R̂t are known, all other variables in the bubbleless equilibrium
can be uniquely determined.
For any σ > 0, the dynamical system in (4.13)-(4.14) has a unique steady state, which
we will call a bubbleless steady state. This result is formally stated in Proposition 4.2.1.
All proofs can be found in Appendix B.
12The derivation of these equations can be found in Appendix A.
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Proposition 3.4.1. A unique bubbleless steady state exists for any σ > 0. The steady-
state values
(
R̂∗, k̂∗
)
are determined by
β
1
σ
(
R̂∗
) 1
σ
1 + β
1
σ
(
R̂∗
) 1
σ
−1 =
(1 + n)α
1− α , (3.16)
k̂∗ = (1− α) 1−σσ+ψ A− 1σ+ψ
[
1 + β
1
σ
(
R̂∗
) 1
σ
−1] σσ+ψ ( α
R̂∗
)η
. (3.17)
Next, we consider the stability property of the bubbleless steady state. This type of
property is crucial in determining the uniqueness of non-stationary bubbleless equilibrium.
When the utility function for consumption is logarithmic, i.e., σ = 1, the dynamical
system in (4.13)-(4.14) is independent of R̂t+1. In this case, (4.13) can be simplified to
become k̂t+1 = Bk̂
α
t , where B is a positive constant, and the unique bubbleless steady
state is globally stable. When σ < 1, the bubbleless steady state can be shown to be
globally saddle-path stable. In both cases, any non-stationary bubbleless equilibrium that
originates from a given initial value k̂T > 0 must be unique and converges to the bubbleless
steady state. In addition, if the post-crash economy begins with an initial value k̂T that
is greater than the steady-state value k̂∗, then k̂t will decline monotonically during the
transition and R̂t will rise monotonically towards R̂
∗. In other words, R̂t and k̂t will
always move in opposite directions on the saddle path. These results are summarized in
Proposition 4.2.2.
Proposition 3.4.2. Suppose σ ≤ 1. Then any non-stationary bubbleless equilibrium that
originates from a given initial value k̂T > 0 must be unique and converges monotonically
to the bubbleless steady state. In particular, the value of R̂T is uniquely determined by
R̂T = Φ
(
k̂T
)
, where Φ : R+ → R+ is a strictly decreasing function. In the transitional
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dynamics, R̂t and k̂t will move in opposite directions so that
(
k̂t − k̂∗
)(
R̂t − R̂∗
)
≤ 0 for
all t ≥ T.
When σ > 1, the bubbleless steady state can be either a sink or a saddle (see Appendix
A for more details). If it is a sink, then there exist multiple sets of equilibrium time paths
that originate from the same initial value k̂T > 0 and converge to the bubbleless steady
state. In other words, local indeterminacy may occur when σ > 1. In this study, we
confine our attention to bubbleless equilibria that are determinate. In particular, we focus
on the case when σ ≤ 1, which means the intertemporal substitution effect of a higher
interest rate is no weaker than the income effect. This assumption is not uncommon in
OLG models. For instance, Galor and Ryder (1989) show that this assumption plays an
important role in establishing the existence, uniqueness and global stability of stationary
equilibrium in a model with exogenous labor supply. Fuster (1999) uses this assumption
to establish the existence and uniqueness of non-stationary equilibrium in a model with
uncertain lifetime and accidental bequest. More recently, Andersen and Bhattacharya
(2013) adopt the same assumption to analyze the welfare implications of unfunded pensions
in a model with endogenous labor supply. In the rational bubble literature, Weil (1987,
Section 2) focuses on equilibria in which the interest elasticity of savings is non-negative.
Under a constant-relative-risk-aversion utility function, this assumption holds if and only
if σ ≤ 1. Other studies allow the per-period utility function to be different across age,
and assume that the coefficient of relative risk aversion is no greater than one in the old
age. For instance, Azariadis and Smith (1993) adopt this assumption to study the general
equilibrium implications of credit rationing in a model with adverse selection. Morand
and Reffett (2007) and Hillebrand (2014) use this assumption to establish the uniqueness
of Markov equilibrium in a model with productivity shocks.
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3.4.2 Bubbly Equilibrium
We now provide the formal definition of a bubbly equilibrium. Given the initial
values K0 > 0 and ε0 = 1, a bubbly equilibrium consists of two sets of sequences
{cy,t, co,t, lt, st,mt, Rt, wt, pt,Kt, Lt}∞t=0 and
{
ĉy,t, ĉo,t, l̂t, ŝt, R̂t, ŵt, K̂t, L̂t
}∞
t=0
that satisfy
the following conditions in every period t ≥ 0.
1. If εt = 0, then
{
ĉy,τ , ĉo,τ , l̂τ , ŝτ , R̂τ , ŵτ , K̂τ , L̂τ
}∞
τ=t
constitutes a non-stationary bub-
bleless equilibrium with initial condition K̂t.
2. If εt = 1, then
(i) given
{
wt, pt, pt+1, Rt+1, R̂t+1
}
, the allocation {cy,t, co,t+1, lt, st,mt} solves the
consumer’s problem at time t, i.e., (4.6)-(3.9) are satisfied;
(ii) given Rt and wt, the aggregate inputs Kt and Lt solve the firm’s problem at
time t, i.e., (4.2) is satisfied;
(iii) all markets clear at time t, i.e., Lt = Ntlt, Kt+1 = Ntst and Ntmt = M ;
(iv) if εt+1 = 0, then K̂t+1 = Kt+1.
The last condition states that if the asset bubble crashes at time t+ 1, then Kt+1 will
provide the initial condition for the ensuing bubbleless equilibrium.
Regardless of the existence of asset bubbles, the labor market clears when the total
supply of labor by young consumers equals the total demand by firms (i.e., L̂t = Nt l̂t
when εt = 0, and Lt = Ntlt when εt = 1); and the market for physical capital clears when
the productive savings made by young consumers equal the stock of aggregate capital in
the next period (i.e., K̂t+1 = Ntŝt when εt = 0, and Kt+1 = Ntst when εt = 1). Note
that, regardless of the state of the asset bubble, the stock of capital at time t + 1 is
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predetermined at time t, and is thus independent of εt+1. This brings us back to one of
the major differences between the present study and Weil (1987) that we have mentioned
in the introduction. In the production economy of Weil (1987), every young consumer
provides one unit of labor inelastically regardless of the existence of asset bubble. Thus,
the equilibrium quantity of labor input at time t + 1 is always determined by Nt+1, i.e.,
Lt+1 = L̂t+1 = Nt+1. Suppose the asset bubble crashes at time t + 1. Since neither Kt+1
nor Lt+1 depends on εt+1, the crash will have no effect on aggregate output and factor
prices at time t+ 1. Thus, in Weil’s (1987) model, the gross return from physical capital
is not contingent on the realization of the asset price shock, i.e., Rt+1 = R̂t+1 for all
t. When labor supply is endogenous, the equilibrium quantity of Lt+1 will also depend
on individual’s choice of lt+1. If this choice is contingent on the realization of εt+1, then
this will open up a channel through which the asset price shock can affect the aggregate
economy. Our next result shows that this channel is operative only if σ 6= 1.
Proposition 3.4.3. Suppose the utility function for consumption is logarithmic, i.e.,
σ = 1. Then the optimal labor supply is constant over time and is identical before and
after the crash. Specifically,
lt = l̂t =
(
1 + β
A
) 1
1+ψ
, for all t ≥ 0.
This result can be explained as follows: Regardless of the existence of asset bubble,
the optimal choice of lt is determined by (4.10). The expression wtc
−σ
y,t on the left captures
both the income and substitution effects of a higher wage rate on labor supply. Holding
cy,t constant, an increase in wt raises the opportunity cost of leisure. This creates a
substitution effect which discourages leisure and promotes labor supply. On the other
hand, an increase in wt also generates an income effect which promotes consumption and
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discourages labor supply. These two effects exactly offset each other when σ = 1. This
happens because in this case, the consumers will save (and consume) a constant fraction
of their labor income in the young age. Consequently, the expression wtc
−1
y,t in (4.10) is
independent of wt, which means individual labor supply is not affected by changes in wage
rate. Thus, when σ = 1, our model is essentially identical to the production economy in
Weil (1987).
When σ < 1, the optimal choice of lt will not be a constant in general, and it will
depend on the realization of the asset price shock. The rest of this paper is devoted
to analyzing the effects of bubbles and crashes under this value of σ. To simplify the
analysis, suppose the economy is in a conditional bubbly steady state before the crash
happens. Formally, a conditional bubbly steady state is a set of stationary values S ≡{
c∗y, c∗o, l∗, s∗, a∗, R∗, R̂∗0, w∗, pi∗, k∗
}
such that conditional on εt = 1, we have pt+1/pt = pi
∗,
Kt = Ntk
∗, Lt = Ntl∗, ptmt = a∗ > 0, and (cy,t, co,t, st, lt, Rt, wt) =
(
c∗y, c∗o, s∗, l∗, R∗, w∗
)
in a bubbly equilibrium.13 The main ideas behind this definition are as follows:
Before the crash happens, the consumers face a stationary environment in which (i) the
probability of having a crash in the next period is constant over time; (ii) the market
wage rate (w∗) and the expected return from the bubbly asset (qpi∗) are identical in every
period; and (iii) the state-contingent returns for physical capital are also identical in every
period (specifically the return is R∗ if the asset bubble persists in the next period and
R̂∗0 otherwise). Thus, the consumers will make the same choices in every period before
the crash happens. In particular, they will invest an amount a∗ > 0 in the asset bubble
in the conditional steady state. Once the asset bubble crashes, the economy will follow
the transition paths described in Proposition 4.2.2 and converge to the bubbleless steady
13The concept of “conditional steady state” is not new in macroeconomics. For instance, Cole and
Rogerson (1999) and Galor and Weil (2000) have defined a similar notion in different contexts.
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state
(
R̂∗, k̂∗
)
. Note that, regardless of the timing of the crash, the dynamical system in
(4.13)-(4.14) will always begin with the same initial values: k∗ and R̂∗0 ≡ Φ (k∗) .14
We now summarize some of the main properties of a conditional bubbly steady state.
Conditional on εt = 1, the market for the intrinsically worthless asset clears when Ntmt =
M. Using this and the stationary conditions pt+1/pt = pi
∗ and ptmt = pt+1mt+1 = a∗, we
can obtain
pt+1
pt
= pi∗ =
mt
mt+1
=
Nt+1
Nt
= 1 + n.
Thus, before the crash happens, the price of the intrinsically worthless asset is growing
deterministically at rate n. Given R̂∗0 > 0, the steady-state values {R∗, w∗, l∗, k∗, a∗} are
uniquely determined by15
1 +
[
1 + (βq)−
1
σ (1 + n)1−
1
σ
]( q
1− q
) 1
σ
(
R̂∗0
1 + n
)1− 1
σ (
1− R
∗
1 + n
) 1
σ
=
1
α
R∗
1 + n
, (3.18)
w∗ = (1− α)
( α
R∗
) α
1−α
, (3.19)
A (l∗)ψ+σ = βq [(1 + n)w∗]1−σ
[
(1− α)R∗
αΩ∗R̂∗0
]σ
, (3.20)
k∗ = l∗
( α
R∗
) 1
1−α
, (3.21)
a∗ =
(
Ω∗R̂∗0 −R∗
)
k∗. (3.22)
Once these values are known, the value of
{
c∗y, c∗o, s∗
}
can be uniquely determined from
the consumer’s budget constraints. Equations (3.18)-(4.19) essentially define a one-to-one
mapping between R̂∗0 and k∗, which we will denote by k∗ = Γ
(
R̂∗0
)
. We now have a pair of
equations, R̂∗0 = Φ (k∗) and k∗ = Γ
(
R̂∗0
)
, which can be used to solve for k∗ and R̂∗0. The
first equation determines the initial value of R̂t in the post-crash bubbleless equilibrium.
14The variable R̂∗0 is not to be confused with the bubbleless steady-state value R̂
∗ defined in Proposition
4.2.1. In the post-crash economy, R̂∗0 is the initial value of R̂t while R̂
∗ is the long-run value.
15The derivation of these equations can be found in Appendix A.
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The actual form of Φ (·) depends on the transitional dynamics in the bubbleless economy.
The second equation states that, given R̂∗0, k∗ = Γ
(
R̂∗0
)
is the value of per-worker capital
in the conditional bubbly steady state. The mapping Γ (·) is determined by (3.18)-(4.19).
These two equations can be combined to form a one-dimensional fixed point equation
R̂∗0 = Φ ◦ Γ
(
R̂∗0
)
, which provides the basis for computing the bubbly equilibrium.
Our next proposition states that when σ < 1, the gross return from physical capital in
the conditional bubbly steady state (R∗) is higher than the one in the bubbleless steady
state
(
R̂∗
)
. This result is due to the combination of two factors. First, since aggregate
uncertainty exists before the crash happens, consumers will require a higher return from
savings in the conditional bubbly steady state. Second, even without any uncertainty,
the existence of asset bubble tends to lower the capital-labor ratio and drives up the
steady-state interest rate [see Shi and Suen (2014) Proposition 2].16
Proposition 3.4.4. Suppose σ < 1. Then the existence of asset bubble is associated with
a higher level of steady-state interest rate, i.e., R∗ > R̂∗.
Our last set of results concerns the expansionary effects of asset bubbles. Specifically,
we seek conditions under which the conditional bubbly steady state has more physical
capital per worker and a higher labor supply than the bubbleless steady state, i.e., k∗ > k̂∗
and l∗ > l̂∗. Note that k∗ > k̂∗ implies that there is more physical capital per worker before
the crash than after, i.e., k∗ ≥ k̂t for all t. To see this, suppose the post-crash economy
begins at time T so that k̂T = k
∗. As shown in Proposition 4.2.2, if k̂T = k∗ > k̂∗, then k̂t
is strictly decreasing along the transition path so that k̂T = k
∗ > k̂t for all t > T.
16This result is also consistent with the findings in other rational bubble models. For instance, the
models of Tirole (1985), Weil (1987), Olivier (2000), and Farhi and Tirole (2012) all predict that the
long-run interest rate is higher in the presence of asset bubble.
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Using (4.19), which is valid both before and after the crash, we can obtain
k∗ = l∗
( α
R∗
) 1
1−α
> l̂∗
(
α
R̂∗
) 1
1−α
= k̂∗ ⇔ l
∗
l̂∗
>
(
R∗
R̂∗
) 1
1−α
> 1. (3.23)
This shows that asset bubbles can potentially crowd in productive investment in the
current framework, but this happens only if these bubbles can induce a sufficiently large
expansion in labor supply.
Regardless of the existence of asset bubbles, individual labor supply is determined by
equation (4.10), which can be rewritten as
Alψ+σt = w
1−σ
t
(
cy,t
wtlt
)−σ
. (3.24)
The above equation shows how individual labor supply is determined by the current wage
rate and the propensity to consume when young. Holding other things constant, labor
supply increases when wage rate increases (as σ < 1). Since R∗ > R̂∗ implies w∗ < ŵ∗,
this effect in itself will lower labor supply in the presence of asset bubble. On the other
hand, labor supply increases when the consumers allocate a smaller fraction of their labor
income to young-age consumption. This captures the intratemporal substitution between
consumption and labor. Thus, l∗ > l̂∗ is possible only if the consumers have a lower
propensity to consume in the conditional bubbly steady state, i.e.,
ĉ∗y
ŵ∗ l̂∗
>
c∗y
w∗l∗
.
In the bubbleless steady state, this propensity is determined by
ĉ∗y
ŵ∗ l̂∗
=
[
1 + β
1
σ
(
R̂∗
) 1
σ
−1]−1
, (3.25)
which is strictly decreasing in the long-run interest rate when σ < 1. A similar expression
can be obtained for its counterpart in the conditional bubbly steady state, which is
c∗y
w∗l∗
=
[
1 + β
1
σ (ρ∗)
1
σ
−1
]−1
, (3.26)
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where
(ρ∗)
1
σ
−1 ≡ [q (1 + n)]
1
σ
Ω∗R̂∗0
[
1 +
1
1 + n
(
Ω∗R̂∗0 −R∗
)]
.
The variable ρ∗ can be interpreted as the certainty equivalent return from investment in
the conditional bubbly steady state. Specifically, this means a consumer in the conditional
bubbly steady state will have the same amount of consumption
(
c∗y, c∗o
)
and labor supply
(l∗) as a consumer in a deterministic bubbleless steady state where the gross return from
savings is ρ∗. Under the assumption of σ < 1, an increase in interest rate will induce the
consumers to save more and consume less when young. Thus, the consumers will have a
lower propensity to consume in the conditional bubbly steady state if and only if ρ∗ > R̂∗.
After some manipulations, we can derive the following equivalent condition:
ĉ∗y
ŵ∗ l̂∗
>
c∗y
w∗l∗
⇔
[
q (1 + n)
R̂∗
] 1
σ
>
Ω∗R̂∗0
R∗
> 1. (3.27)
Finally, using (4.17) and (4.21)-(4.23), we can derive a necessary and sufficient condition
for l∗ > l̂∗ and one for k∗ > k̂∗. The results are stated in Proposition 3.4.5.
Proposition 3.4.5. Suppose σ < 1. Then l∗ > l̂∗ if and only if
[
q (1 + n)
R̂∗
] 1
σ
(
R∗
R̂∗
)−α(1−σ)
(1−α)σ
>
Ω∗R̂∗0
R∗
,
and the asset bubble can crowd in productive investment, i.e., k∗ > k̂∗, if and only if
[
q (1 + n)
R̂∗
] 1
σ
(
R∗
R̂∗
)−[1+ ψ+σ
(1−α)σ
]
>
Ω∗R̂∗0
R∗
.
3.4.3 Numerical Examples
We now present a set of numerical examples to illustrate how the key variables in our
model respond to an asset bubble crash. Through these examples, we also want to highlight
the importance of σ in determining the macroeconomic effects of asset bubbles. We stress
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at the outset that these examples are only intended to demonstrate the working of the
model and the results in the previous sections. For this reason, some of the parameter
values are specifically chosen so that asset bubbles can crowd in productive investment in
some cases.
Suppose one model period takes 30 years. Set the annual subjective discount factor
to 0.9950 and the annual employment growth rate to 1.6 percent.17 These values imply
β = (0.9950)30 = 0.8604 and n = (1.0160)30 − 1 = 0.6099. In addition, we set q = 0.90,
α = 0.30 so that the share of capital income in total output is 30 percent, and ψ = 0 so
that the utility function in (4.1) is quasi-linear in labor hours. As shown in Hansen (1985),
this type of utility function is consistent with the assumption of indivisible labor. Our
choice of q and n implies that the expected return from the intrinsically worthless asset
is q (1 + n) = 1.4490. To highlight the importance of σ, we consider four different values
of this parameter between 0.10 and 0.30. For each value of σ, the parameter A is chosen
so that l̂∗ is 0.50.18 For each set of parameter values, we solve for the equilibrium time
paths under the following scenario: Suppose the economy starts from a conditional bubbly
steady state at time t = 0, and suppose the bubble bursts unexpectedly at time t = 3.19
We then solve for the conditional bubbly steady state and the bubbleless steady state, and
compute the transition path in the post-crash economy using backward shooting method.
17The latter is consistent with the average annual growth rate of U.S. employment over the period
1953-2008.
18Under the assumption of indivisible labor, the variable lt is more suitably interpreted as the labor
force participation rate at time t. Thus, we choose a target value of l̂∗ based on the average labor force
participation rate in the United States during the postwar period, which is about 0.50.
19In other words, we consider a particular sequence of asset price shocks in which εt = 1 for t ∈ {0, 1, 2}
and εt = 0 for t ≥ 3. As explained earlier, the non-stationary bubbleless equilibrium will always begin with
the same initial values k∗ and R̂∗0 regardless of the timing of the crash. Thus, the exact time period when
the crash happens is immaterial.
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Table 1
Conditional Bubbly Steady State vs Bubbleless Steady State
σ = 0.10 σ = 0.15 σ = 0.20 σ = 0.30
Steady State Bubbleless Bubbly Bubbleless Bubbly Bubbleless Bubbly Bubbleless Bubbly
R 1.2176 1.4671 1.2416 1.4548 1.2637 1.4485 1.3036 1.4434
ρ — 1.4402 — 1.4382 — 1.4381 — 1.4395
cy 0.0832 0.0374 0.0846 0.0538 0.0858 0.0640 0.0878 0.0758
l 0.5000 0.7306 0.5000 0.5862 0.5000 0.5416 0.5000 0.5132
k 0.0676 0.0757 0.0657 0.0614 0.0641 0.0571 0.0613 0.0544
y 0.2743 0.3701 0.2720 0.2980 0.2700 0.2758 0.2664 0.2617
a 0 0.0998 0 0.0559 0 0.0371 0 0.0198
Note: The notation y denotes per-worker output, i.e., y = kαl1−α.
Table 1 shows the key variables in the conditional bubbly steady state and the bub-
bleless steady state under different values of σ. In the first row, we report the value of
R̂∗ and R∗ in each case. In the second row, we report the certainty equivalent return
from savings in the conditional bubbly steady state. In all four cases, we have ρ∗ > R̂∗
and l∗ > l̂∗. In particular, the gap between l∗ and l̂∗ widens as the value of σ decreases.
This captures the effects of a stronger intertemporal substitution effect. When σ = 0.1,
the difference between l∗ and l̂∗ is sufficiently large so that asset bubble can crowd in
productive investment (i.e., k∗ > k̂∗).
Figures 10-12 show the time path of interest rate (R), labor supply (l) and per-worker
capital (k) before and after the crash happens at t = 3. In all four cases, the crash induces
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an immediate reduction in interest rate and labor supply. During the transition, R̂t and k̂t
move in opposite directions as predicted by Proposition 4.2.2. In the more interesting case
where asset bubble crowds in physical capital (i.e., σ = 0.1), labor supply and productive
investment fall markedly at the time of the crash and continue to decline afterward. These
patterns are qualitatively similar to those observed in the United States after the bursting
of the internet bubble and the housing price bubble.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
The present study joins a growing body of literature that examines the effects of asset
price bubbles and crashes on the aggregate economy. We contribute to this literature by
demonstrating the importance of intratemporal and intertemporal substitution effects to
the issue at hand. In particular, we show that the existence of asset bubbles can crowd
in productive investment and induce an expansion in aggregate employment when these
effects are sufficiently strong. We remark that the present study is mainly theoretical in
nature and more effort is needed in order to generate realistic quantitative results. In
particular, expanding the consumer’s planning horizon (and thus reducing the length of
each model period) is crucial for matching the model to the data. Introducing other model
features, such as financial market imperfections and heterogeneity in firm productivity as
in Martin and Ventura (2012) and Farhi and Tirole (2012), may also help expand the
range of parameter values under which asset bubbles can crowd in productive investment.
We leave these intriguing possibilities for future research.
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Appendix A: Mathematical Derivations
Post-Crash Equilibrium
In this section, we provide a detailed characterization of a post-crash equilibrium. S-
ince the consumer’s problem in the post-crash economy is standard, the derivations of
(4.3)-(4.5) are omitted. The dynamical system in (4.13)-(4.14) can be derived as follows.
In equilibrium, the market wage rate and the gross return from physical capital are deter-
mined by ŵt = (1− α) K̂αt L̂−αt and R̂t = αK̂α−1t L̂1−αt , respectively. Using these, we can
obtain
ŵt l̂t =
1− α
α
R̂tk̂t, (3.28)
ŵt = (1− α)
(
α
R̂t
) α
1−α
, (3.29)
l̂t =
(
R̂t
α
) 1
1−α
k̂t. (3.30)
where k̂t ≡ K̂t/Nt and l̂t ≡ L̂t/Nt. Then we can rewrite the capital market clearing
condition as
(1 + n) k̂t+1 =
 β 1σ
(
R̂t+1
) 1
σ
−1
1 + β
1
σ
(
R̂t+1
) 1
σ
−1
 ŵt l̂t ≡ Σ(R̂t+1) ŵt l̂t.
Substituting (A.2) into the above expression gives (4.13). Next, substituting (A.2) and
(A.3) into (4.4) gives(
R̂t
α
) 1
1−α
k̂t = A
− 1
σ+ψ
[
1 + β
1
σ
(
R̂t+1
) 1
σ
−1] σσ+ψ [
(1− α)
(
α
R̂t
) α
1−α
] 1−σ
σ+ψ
⇒
(
R̂t
α
)η
k̂t =
[
(1− α)1−σ
A
] 1
σ+ψ [
1 + β
1
σ
(
R̂t+1
) 1
σ
−1] σσ+ψ
, (3.31)
where
η ≡ 1
1− α +
α
1− α
1− σ
σ + ψ
=
ψ + α+ σ (1− α)
(1− α) (σ + ψ) > 0,
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η − 1 = α
1− α
1 + ψ
σ + ψ
> 0,
for any σ > 0. Equation (4.14) can be obtained by rearranging terms in (A.4).
Local Analysis
We now explore the local stability property of the unique bubbleless steady state under
different values of σ. To achieve this, we consider a linearized version of the dynamical
system in (4.13)-(4.14). First, taking logarithms of both sides of these equations gives
ln k̂t+1 − ln Σ
(
R̂t+1
)
= ln
[
1− α
α (1 + n)
]
+ ln R̂t + ln k̂t,
ln
αη
[
(1− α)1−σ
A
] 1
σ+ψ
+ σσ + ψ ln
(
1 + β
1
σ R̂
1
σ
−1
t+1
)
= η ln R̂t + ln k̂t.
Next, taking the first-order Taylor expansion of these equations around
(
k̂∗, R̂∗
)
gives
k̂t+1 −
R̂∗Σ′
(
R̂∗
)
Σ
(
R̂∗
) R̂t+1 = k̂t + R̂t,
1− σ
σ + ψ
 β 1σ
(
R̂∗
) 1
σ
−1
1 + β
1
σ
(
R̂∗
) 1
σ
−1
 R̂t+1 = k̂t + ηR̂t,
where k̂t ≡
(
k̂t − k̂∗
)
/k̂∗ and R̂t ≡
(
R̂t − R̂∗
)
/R̂∗ represent the percentage deviations of
k̂t and R̂t from their steady-state values. Finally, rewrite the linearized system in matrix
form  1 b12
0 b22

︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
 k̂t+1
R̂t+1
 =
 1 1
1 η

 k̂t
R̂t
 , (3.32)
where
b12 = −
R̂∗Σ′
(
R̂∗
)
Σ
(
R̂∗
) = (1− 1
σ
)[
1 + β
1
σ
(
R̂∗
) 1
σ
−1]−1
,
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b22 =
1− σ
σ + ψ
 β 1σ
(
R̂∗
) 1
σ
−1
1 + β
1
σ
(
R̂∗
) 1
σ
−1
 .
The inverse of the matrix B is given by
B−1 =
1
b22
 b22 −b12
0 1
 .
Using this, we can rewrite (A.5) as k̂t+1
R̂t+1
 = 1b22
 b22 − b12 b22 − ηb12
1 η

︸ ︷︷ ︸
J
 k̂t
R̂t
 , (3.33)
where J is the Jacobian matrix of the linearized system. Let ρ1 and ρ2 be the characteristic
roots of the linearized system. These can be obtained by solving
Ξ (ρ) ≡ ρ2 −
(
1− b12
b22
+
η
b22
)
ρ+
η − 1
b22
= 0.
If σ < 1, then we have b12 < 0 and b22 > 0 which imply
Ξ (ρ) > 0, for all ρ < 0,
Ξ (0) =
η − 1
b22
> 0, as η > 1,
Ξ (1) ≡ 1−
(
1− b12
b22
+
η
b22
)
+
η − 1
b22
=
b12 − 1
b22
< 0.
The last two inequalities ensure that one of the characteristic roots can be found within
the interval of (0, 1) . This rules out the possibility of complex roots. Since Ξ (ρ) > 0 for
all ρ ≤ 0, both ρ1 and ρ2 must be strictly positive. Finally, if both ρ1 and ρ2 are within
the interval of (0, 1] , then we should have Ξ (1) ≥ 0 instead. Thus, the second root must
be greater than one. This proves that the system in (A.6) is saddle-path stable within the
neighborhood of the bubbleless steady state when σ < 1. Proposition 4.2.2 strengthens
this result by showing that this steady state is globally saddle-path stable when σ < 1.
46
If σ > 1, then we have b12 ∈ (0, 1) and b22 < 0 which imply Ξ (0) < 0 < Ξ (1) . Hence,
one of the characteristic roots must lie within the interval of (0, 1) . Since the product of
roots Ξ (0) is strictly negative, the second characteristic root must be strictly negative.
If Ξ (−1) > 0, then the second root must lie within the interval of (−1, 0) . In this case,
the linearized system has two stable roots which means the bubbleless steady state is a
sink. If Ξ (−1) < 0, then the absolute magnitude of the second root is greater than one.
In this case, the bubbleless steady state is again saddle-path stable. The value of Ξ (−1)
is determined by
Ξ (−1) = 2− b12
b22︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
+
2η − 1
b22︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
.
Unfortunately, the sign of this expression cannot be readily determined. Hence, the local
stability property of the post-crash equilibrium is ambiguous when σ > 1.
Bubbly Equilibrium
In this section, we will provide a detailed characterization of the consumer’s problem
in the pre-crash economy, and present the derivation of (3.18)-(4.20). Substituting (4.6)
and (4.7) into the consumer’s expected lifetime utility gives
L = (wtlt − st − ptmt)
1−σ
1− σ −A
l1+ψt
1 + ψ
+β
q (Rt+1st + pt+1mt)1−σ + (1− q)
(
R̂t+1st
)1−σ
1− σ
 .
The first-order conditions with respect to st, mt and lt are, respectively, given by
(wtlt − st − ptmt)−σ = β
[
qRt+1 (Rt+1st + pt+1mt)
−σ + (1− q) R̂t+1
(
R̂t+1st
)−σ]
,
(3.34)
(wtlt − st − ptmt)−σ = βq
(
pt+1
pt
)
(Rt+1st + pt+1mt)
−σ , (3.35)
Alψt = wt (wtlt − st − ptmt)−σ . (3.36)
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Here we only focus on interior solutions of mt. Define pit+1 ≡ pt+1/pt. Combining (A.1)
and (A.8) gives
qpit+1 (Rt+1st + pt+1mt)
−σ = qRt+1 (Rt+1st + pt+1mt)−σ + (1− q) R̂t+1
(
R̂t+1st
)−σ
,
⇒ q (pit+1 −Rt+1) (Rt+1st + pt+1mt)−σ = (1− q) R̂t+1
(
R̂t+1st
)−σ
,
⇒ Rt+1st + pt+1mt =
[
q (pit+1 −Rt+1)
(1− q) R̂t+1
] 1
σ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ωt+1
(
R̂t+1st
)
, (3.37)
⇒ mt = 1
pt+1
(
Ωt+1R̂t+1 −Rt+1
)
st,
⇒ st + ptmt =
[
1 +
Rt+1
pit+1
(Λt+1 − 1)
]
st, (3.38)
where Λt+1 ≡ Ωt+1R̂t+1/Rt+1. Using (A.8) and (A.10), we can get
Rt+1st + pt+1mt = (βqpit+1)
1
σ (wtlt − st − ptmt) = Ωt+1R̂t+1st,
⇒ st =
 (βqpit+1)
1
σ
Ωt+1R̂t+1 + (βqpit+1)
1
σ
[
1 + Rt+1pit+1 (Λt+1 − 1)
]
wtlt. (3.39)
Using this and (A.6), we can obtain
cy,t = wtlt − (st + ptmt) =
 Ωt+1R̂t+1Ωt+1R̂t+1 + (βqpit+1) 1σ [1 + Rt+1pit+1 (Λt+1 − 1)]
wtlt. (3.40)
Substituting this into (A.9) and rearranging terms give
Alψ+σt = (wt)
1−σ
Ωt+1R̂t+1 + (βqpit+1)
1
σ
[
1 + Rt+1pit+1 (Λt+1 − 1)
]
Ωt+1R̂t+1

σ
. (3.41)
These equations characterize the optimal choice of cy,t, lt, st and mt before the crash.
We now provide the derivation of (3.18)-(4.20). In equilibrium, the market for physical
capital clears when
(1 + n) kt+1 = st =
 (βqpit+1)
1
σ
Ωt+1R̂t+1 + (βqpit+1)
1
σ
[
1 + Rt+1pit+1 (Λt+1 − 1)
]
wtlt
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⇒ (1 + n) kt+1 =
 (βqpit+1)
1
σ
Ωt+1R̂t+1 + (βqpit+1)
1
σ
[
1 + Rt+1pit+1 (Λt+1 − 1)
]

(
1− α
α
)
Rtkt.
(3.42)
The second line uses the fact that αwtlt = (1− α)Rtkt. Combining (A.7) and (A.9) gives
Alψ+σt = (wt)
1−σ
{
(βqpit+1)
1
σ
Ωt+1R̂t+1
[
1− α
α (1 + n)
]
Rtkt
kt+1
}σ
. (3.43)
Upon setting kt+1 = kt = k
∗, Rt = Rt+1 = R∗, R̂t+1 = R̂∗0 and pit+1 = 1 + n, equation
(A.9) becomes
1 + n =
 [βq (1 + n)]
1
σ
Ω∗R̂∗0 + [βq (1 + n)]
1
σ
[
1 + R
∗
1+n (Λ
∗ − 1)
]

(
1− α
α
)
R∗, (3.44)
where Λ∗ = Ω∗R̂∗0/R∗. Rearranging terms in this equation gives
1 +
[
1 + (βq)−
1
σ (1 + n)1−
1
σ
](Ω∗R̂∗0
1 + n
)
=
1
α
R∗
1 + n
⇒ 1 +
[
1 + (βq)−
1
σ (1 + n)1−
1
σ
]( q
1− q
) 1
σ
(
R̂∗0
1 + n
)1− 1
σ (
1− R
∗
1 + n
) 1
σ
=
1
α
R∗
1 + n
,
which is equation (3.18) in the text. Similarly, after substituting the stationarity conditions
into (A.11), we can obtain
A (l∗)ψ+σ = (w∗)1−σ
{
[βq (1 + n)]
1
σ
Ω∗R̂∗0
(
1− α
α
)
R∗
1 + n
}σ
.
Equation (4.18) follows immediately from this equation. Equations (4.17) and (4.19) can
be obtained from (4.2). Finally, equation (4.20) can be obtained from (4.8).
Define θ∗ ≡ R∗/(1 + n). Then we can rewrite (3.18) as
Ψ (θ∗) ≡ 1 +
[
1 + (βq)−
1
σ (1 + n)1−
1
σ
]( q
1− q
) 1
σ
(
R̂∗0
1 + n
)1− 1
σ
(1− θ∗) 1σ = θ
∗
α
. (3.45)
For any R̂∗0 > 0 and σ > 0, Ψ : [0, 1] → R+ is a strictly decreasing function that satisfies
Ψ (0) > 0 and Ψ (1) = 1 < 1/α. Meanwhile, the right-hand side of the above equation is a
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straight line that passes through the origin and 1/α (when θ∗ = 1). Thus, for any R̂∗0 > 0
and σ > 0, there exists a unique θ∗ ∈ (0, 1) that solves (A.12). Once θ∗ is determined, the
value of {k∗, w∗, l∗, a∗} can be uniquely determined using (4.17)-(4.20).
Propensity to Consumer When Young
Using (A.13), we can get
c∗y
w∗l∗
=
Ω∗R̂∗0
Ω∗R̂∗0 + β
1
σ [q (1 + n)]
1
σ
[
1 + R
∗
1+n (Λ
∗ − 1)
]
=
{
1 + β
1
σ
[q (1 + n)]
1
σ
Ω∗R̂∗0
[
1 +
R∗
1 + n
(Λ∗ − 1)
]}−1
≡
[
1 + β
1
σ (ρ∗)
1
σ
−1
]−1
,
where ρ∗ is the certainty equivalent return defined in the text. An alternative expression for
the propensity to consume can be obtained as follows. First, rewrite the above expression
as
c∗y
w∗l∗
=
Ω∗R̂∗0
[βq (1 + n)]
1
σ
 [βq (1 + n)]
1
σ
Ω∗R̂∗0 + [βq (1 + n)]
1
σ
[
1 + R
∗
1+n (Λ
∗ − 1)
]
 . (3.46)
Using (A.13), we can obtain
[βq (1 + n)]
1
σ
Ω∗R̂∗0 + [βq (1 + n)]
1
σ
[
1 + R
∗
1+n (Λ
∗ − 1)
] = α (1 + n)
1− α
1
R∗
.
Substituting this into (A.10) gives
c∗y
w∗l∗
=
Ω∗R̂∗0
[βq (1 + n)]
1
σ
[
α (1 + n)
1− α
1
R∗
]
.
On the other hand, in the bubbleless steady state, we have
ĉ∗y
ŵ∗ l̂∗
=
[
1 + β
1
σ
(
R̂∗
) 1
σ
−1]−1
=
α (1 + n)
1− α
(
βR̂∗
)− 1
σ
.
The second equality follows from (4.15). Hence, we have
ĉ∗y
ŵ∗ l̂∗
>
c∗y
w∗l∗
⇔
(
R̂∗
)− 1
σ
>
Ω∗R̂∗0
[q (1 + n)]
1
σ
1
R∗
⇔
[
q (1 + n)
R̂∗
] 1
σ
>
Ω∗R̂∗0
R∗
.
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Figure 3.1: Dow Jones Industrial Average and S&P 500, 1995-2003.
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Figure 3.2: Case-Shiller 20-City Home Price Index, June 2003 to June 2010.
Figure 3.3: Total Employment and Dow Jones Index, 1995-2003.
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Figure 3.4: Aggregate Hours and Dow Jones Index, 1995-2003.
Figure 3.5: Private Nonresidential Fixed Investment and Dow Jones Index, 1995Q1 to
2003Q4.
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Figure 3.6: Total Employment and Home Price Index, June 2003 to June 2010.
Figure 3.7: Aggregate Hours and Home Price Index, June 2003 to June 2010.
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Figure 3.8: Private Nonresidential Fixed Investment and Home Price Index, 2003Q3 to
2010Q3.
Figure 3.9: Probability Tree Diagram of the Asset Price Shock.
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Figure 3.10: Time Paths of Interest Rate under Different Values of σ.
Figure 3.11: Time Paths of Labor Supply under Different Values of σ.
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Figure 3.12: Time Paths of Capital under Different Values of σ.
Chapter 4
Bank Competition and Capital Accumulation in a Costly
State Verification Model
4.1 Introduction
This paper examines theoretically the effects of bank competition on capital accu-
mulation. To achieve this, we develop a dynamic general equilibrium in which financial
intermediaries or banks engage in Cournot competition in the loan market and the deposit
market, and lending activities take place under asymmetric information and costly mon-
itoring. Within this framework, we provide conditions under which a more competitive
banking structure is beneficial to capital accumulation. It has long been recognized that
development of financial intermediation can promote economic growth. But many of these
arguments are based on a perfectly competitive financial market. To resolve this limit,
recent studies have started to examine the macroeconomic effects of the industrial orga-
nization of the banking system. But these studies typically focus on two extreme cases:
perfectly competitive banking system versus monopoly banking system. Still, not enough
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attention has been paid to the banking structure in between, i.e., an oligopoly system.
The present study is intended to fill this gap.
There is ample evidence showing that the banking sector in the United States has
undergone significant changes and became increasingly concentrated over the past decades.
According to Janicki and Prescott (2006), the number of independent banks in the United
States has dropped from 13,000 to about 6,500 over the period 1960-2005. This dramatic
reduction is largely due to the deregulations that took effect in the 1980s and the 1990s. At
the same time, the bank size distribution (measured in terms of bank assets) has became
much more concentrated. In 1960, the share of assets held by the ten largest banks was
21%. This increased to around 60% by 2005. Similarly, in the past three decades, the
number of banks in operation has reduced substantially in many European countires. In
Germany, this figure dropped from 3,717 to 1686, contracting by 55% between the year1993
to 2012. How will bank’s competition in a concentrated market impact the economy in
terms of saving and the deposit interest, capital accumulation, and the borrowing lending
activities?
This paper attempts to answer these questions in a dynamic general equilibrium frame-
work. Specifically, we employ a variant of Diamond’s two-period overlapping generations
(OG) model as the analytical vehicle. Investment in capital accumulation can be funded
internally or externally via financial intermediation. The borrowing and lending activities
are subject to asymmetric information and costly state verification (CSV) problems as in
Townsend (1979) and Williamson (1986, 1987). Thus, in our framework, banks not only
intermediate the supply and demand of credit, they also serve as monitors of investment
activities. We also extend the standard CSV model to allow for the use of collateral and
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endogenize the leverage ratio. In the financial markets, banks engage in Cournot compe-
titions. Specifically, they compete both in the deposit market to gather savings and in the
loan market to lend to entrepreneurs. Our main findings are largely consistent with the
common wisdom. All else being equal, a more competitive financial environment induces
higher capital accumulation mainly because the competition encourages more savings as
well as borrowing by driving up the deposit rate and depressing the charges on loans. An
adverse consequence, however, is that as the entrepreneurs raise their leverage ratio, the
agency problem becomes more severe. Banks therefore demand more frequent monitoring
and more resources are wasted in the verification process.
In the numerical experiments, we compare the economies with different characteristics.
One interesting result is the mixing effect of agents’ intertemporal elasticity of substitution
(IES). It is shown that IES might have opposite impact on the capital accumulation
depending on the deposit rate the economy originally exhibits. A higher IES will increase
(decrease) the capital accumulation if the deposit rate is high (low) at first. The main
reason lies in the interaction between IES and the deposit rate. In a world with high
deposit return, increase in IES tends to discourage saving, while the opposite is true when
the deposit return is high. The change in IES also implies different ability for banks to
extract profit. Savers with lower IES are less sensitive to deposit rate, which gives banks
more power in the deposit market. As a result, we see a larger gap between the loan and
deposit interest.
The present study provides the first attempt to connect two strands of literature. In
macroeconomics, there is now a large number of studies that explore the interrelationship
between financial intermediation and the real economy in the presence of CSV problem.
Examples of these studies include Boyd and Smith (1998a, 1998b), Huybens and Smith
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(1999), Guzman (2000), Khan (2001), and Paal et al. (2005) among many others. These
studies, however, either focus on a perfectly competitive banking system or a monopolistic
banking system. Few attention has been paid to the oligopolistic banking structure. In
the finance literature, many studies have examined the effect of market power in the
banking sector using a partial equilibrium framework. In an early study, Petersen and
Rajan (1995) examine this issue from the perspective of relationship-based banking and
lending. More recently, Allen and Gale (2004), Boyd and De Nicolo´ (2005) and Boyd et al.
(2009) have investigated the relation between bank competition and the stability of the
banking sector. Hauswald and Marquez (2006) stress bank’s role of information collection
when studying the consequence of competition on the efficiency credit market. All these
studies, however, are abstracted from the aggregate economic effect.
Several attempts have also been conducted to analyze the concentration in the banking
industry and the aggregate economic outcome, but with different focuses. For example,
Deidda and Fattouh (2005) once assumed that in the process of intermediating credits,
banks demands capital and they compete with real sector for the use of it. Thus on one
hand, less concentrated banking sector promote specialization and enhances efficiency, on
the other hand, it induces duplication of use of capital. A more recent work by Cetorelli
and Peretto (2012) pointed out the ”free riding” problem when competitive banks offer
relationship services to firms in order to reduce default rate of the loans. The relationship
services are beneficial to investments but may be depressed by bank competition. Unlike
their works, this paper highlights the asymmetric information between lenders and bor-
rowers and study how bank competition influences the borrowing and monitoring activities
under the asymmetry, and consequently, the capital production.
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The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows: the baseline model is outlined in
Section 2, where we consider a banking sector that has market power only in the deposit
market. Section 3 extends the analysis to the economy where banks have market power
in both the deposit and the loan market. Section 4 presents the numerical results while
Section 5 concludes.
4.2 The Baseline Model
Time is discrete and is denoted by t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...} . The economy under study is inhab-
ited by an infinite sequence of overlapping generations. Each generation has a continuum
of individuals who live two periods. The size of generation t is given by Nt = (1 + n)
t ,
where n > 0 is a constant growth rate. All individuals are endowed with one unit of time
in the young age, which they supply inelastically to work. All individuals are retired when
old. Within each cohort there are two types of individuals, which we label as depositors
and entrepreneurs. The share of entrepreneurs in each cohort is constant over time and is
denoted by α ∈ (0, 1) .
Depositors and entrepreneurs differ in two regards: First, depositors have standard
concave preferences for consumption in both periods of life, whereas entrepreneurs are
risk neutral and only care about old-age consumption. Second, depositors can only save
by depositing funds in the banks, whereas entrepreneurs can choose either to save in the
banks or invest in risky investment projects. The exact nature of these projects will be
described later.
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4.2.1 Final Good Production
There is a single final good in this economy which can be used for consumption and
investment. In the final-good sector, there is a large number of identical firms. In each
period, each firm hires workers, rents physical capital and produces final goods according
to
Yt = K
φ
t L
1−φ
t , with φ ∈ (0, 1) ,
where Yt denotes output at time t, Kt and Lt denote capital input and labor input,
respectively. Markets for final goods and factors of production are assumed to be perfectly
competitive.
Since the production function exhibits constant returns to scale, we can focus on the
choices made by a single, price-taking firm. The representative firm’s problem is given by
max
Kt,Lt
{
Kφt L
1−φ
t − wtLt − ρtKt
}
,
where wt is the wage rate at time t and ρt is the rental price of physical capital. The
first-order conditions of this problem are given by
ρt = φK
φ−1
t L
1−φ
t and wt = (1− φ)Kφt L−φt .
4.2.2 Depositors
Consider a depositor who is born at time t. Let cy,t and co,t+1 denote his consumption
in the young age and old age, respectively. His preferences over (cy,t, co,t+1) are represented
by
U (cy,t, co,t+1) =
c1−σy,t
1− σ + β
c1−σo,t+1
1− σ , (4.1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor and σ > 0 is the inverse of intertemporal
elasticity of substitution (IES). The depositor’s labor income when young (wt) is allocated
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between consumption and deposit holdings (dt) . The gross return from bank deposit is
deterministic and is denoted by Rt+1.
Taking wt and Rt+1 as given, the depositor’s problem is to choose an allocation
(cy,t, co,t+1, dt) so as to maximize his lifetime utility in (4.1), subject to the budget con-
straints: cy,t + dt = wt and co,t+1 = Rt+1dt. The solution of this problem is standard and
is given by
cy,t =
wt
1 + β
1
σR
1
σ
−1
t+1
, and dt =
 β 1σR 1σ−1t+1
1 + β
1
σR
1
σ
−1
t+1
wt ≡ Σ (Rt+1)wt, (4.2)
where Σ (Rt+1) is the depositor’s personal saving rate. If the depositor’s IES is greater
than (or less than) unity, then the personal saving rate is strictly increasing (or strictly
decreasing) in Rt+1. In the knife-edge case where σ = 1 (i.e., logarithmic utility), the
depositor’s personal saving rate is independent of the return from deposit. Since all the
depositors within the same cohort are identical, the aggregate supply of deposit is given
by Dt ≡ (1− α)Ntdt. It follows that the aggregate supply curve of bank deposit is upward
sloping (or downward sloping) when the IES is greater than (or less than) one.
4.2.3 Entrepreneurs
In each period t, each young entrepreneur has access to a risky investment project.
The entrepreneur can use both internal funding (i.e., his own savings st) and external
financing (i.e., borrowing bt) to fund the project. The total amount of investment is
denoted by It = st + bt. By investing It ≥ 0 units of final goods at time t, the project will
generate zIt units of physical capital at time t+1, where z is an idiosyncratic productivity
shock. The random variable z is drawn from the interval [0, z] according to the distribution
G (z) , where G : [0, z] → [0, 1] is a twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing
function. The productivity shock is assumed to be independent across entrepreneurs. At
64
the beginning of time t + 1, the value of z is privately and costlessly observed by the
entrepreneur. All other agents (including the external financier) will have to incur a cost
in order to observe this value. The entrepreneur then rents the physical capital to the
firms in the final-good sector at a rate ρt+1. Thus, the gross return from investment is
ρ˜t+1zIt units of final goods at time t+ 1, where ρ˜t+1 ≡ (1− δ + ρt+1) and δ ∈ (0, 1) is the
depreciation rate of physical capital.
4.2.4 Financial Intermediation
All the borrowing and lending activities are carried out through financial intermediaries
or banks.1 The total number of banks in this economy is denoted by M, which is a
positive integer. Each bank accepts deposits from the depositors and provides loans to a
large number of entrepreneurs. By lending to a large number of entrepreneurs, the bank
can diversify away the idiosyncratic risk associated with the investment projects. Thus,
the bank can offer a riskless return (Rt+1) to the depositors. Similar to Matutes and
Vives (2000), Allen and Gale (2004) and Boyd, De Nicolo` and Jalal (2009), we assume
that there is imperfect competition in the deposit market. The loan market, on the other
hand, is assumed to be perfectly competitive. Besides lending to businesses, each bank
can also choose to lend to other banks in the interbank loan market. The gross return
form interbank loan between time t and time t + 1 is denoted by Rt+1. In the following
subsections, we first describe and analyze the lending operations of an individual bank,
then we turn to the imperfect competition in the deposit market.
1One justification for this assumption is that the financial intermediaries have a cost advantage in
monitoring loan contracts over individual depositors. See Diamond (1984) and Williamson (1986) for a
formal analysis of delegated monitoring under a perfectly competitive credit market.
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4.2.4.1 Loan Contracts
Any entrepreneur who is in need of external finance will have to negotiate a loan
contract with a bank. The bank has perfect knowledge about the distribution of the
productivity shocks, but it cannot directly observe the realized values of the shock. Thus,
it has to rely on the entrepreneur’s report when collecting repayment. This asymmetry
of information provides an incentive for the entrepreneur to misreport the productivity
level in order to lower repayment. As a countermeasure, the bank can verify or audit the
accuracy of the report by incurring a cost. Following Khan (2001), we assume that the
costs of verification are proportional to the output of the investment project. Intuitively,
this means projects with high value also tend to be more complex, and are thus more
costly to appraise and monitor. For a project with gross return ρ˜t+1z (st + bt) , the costs
of verification are given by λρ˜t+1z (st + bt) , where λ ∈ (0, 1) .
A loan contract in this context is characterized by three things: (i) the amount of
borrowing bt ≥ 0, (ii) a repayment schedule Qt : [0, z]→ R+ which specifies the amount of
repayment in each possible state, and (iii) the circumstances under which auditing would
occur. These circumstances are summarized by a subset At in the state space [0, z]. The
loan contract will have the following properties: First, the repayment must be affordable
by the entrepreneur. This means the repayment in any given state cannot exceed the
output of the investment project, i.e.,
Qt (z) ≤ ρ˜t+1z (st + bt) , for all z ∈ [0, z] . (4.3)
Second, the contract will induce the entrepreneur to report the true value of the produc-
tivity shock. Third, any optimal contract must give the bank an expected return that is
66
no less than the return from the interbank loan market Rt+1, so that∫ z
0
Qt (z) dG (z)− λρ˜t+1 (st + bt)
∫
At
zdG (z) ≥ Rt+1bt, (4.4)
where λρ˜t+1 (st + bt)
∫
At
zdG (z) is the expected cost of verification. Equation (4.4)is also
referred to as the bank’s participation constraint. Finally, an optimal contract is one that
maximizes the entrepreneur’s expected return after repayment. Thus, an optimal contract
is one that solves the following maximization problem:
Wt (st) ≡ max
Qt(·),At,bt
{∫ z
0
[ρ˜t+1z (st + bt)−Qt (z)] dG (z)
}
(4.5)
subject to (4.3) and (4.4).
Since the work of Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Williamson (1986, 1987), it is well-
known that the optimal loan contract under costly state verification will take the form of
a standard debt contract.2 The specifics of this type of contract are as follows: In order to
curb the agency problem, the bank will always choose to audit in some states. Specifically,
auditing will occur if the reported productivity is lower than a certain threshold, denoted
by ẑt. Thus, the verification region At can be represented by At = [0, ẑt] . Once auditing
happens, the bank will effectively take over the investment project and retain a fraction
(1− λ) of the project return. If the reported productivity is greater than the threshold,
then the amount of repayment is independent of the reported state. The repayment
schedule under the optimal loan contract can be represented by3
Qt (z) =

ρ˜t+1 (st + bt) z, for z ∈ [0, ẑt] ,
ρ˜t+1 (st + bt) ẑt ≡ qt, for z ∈ (ẑt, z] .
(4.6)
2The contracting problem in the current study, however, has some features that are not present in these
original work (e.g., the use of collateral and endogenous leverage). Thus, for the sake of completeness, we
provide a detailed characterization of the optimal contract in Appendix A.
3Alternatively, one can interpret At as the states under which the entrepreneur will declare bankruptcy.
Specifically, the entrepreneur is called bankrupt if the realized productivity is too low (i.e., lower than ẑt)
so that he cannot afford the fixed repayment qt specified in the loan contract.
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Note that in the event of auditing, the entrepreneur’s own savings st will be confiscated
by the bank. Thus, st also serves as a collateral for the loan. Under an optimal contract,
the bank’s participation constraint must be binding. This means the bank’s expected
return from business lending must be equated to the outside return Rt+1. Using (4.6) and
the bank’s participation constraint, we can derive an expression for the size of borrowing,
which is
bt =
[
J (ẑt) ρ˜t+1
Rt+1 − J (ẑt) ρ˜t+1
]
st, (4.7)
where
J (x) ≡ (1− λ)
∫ x
0
zdG (z) + x [1−G (x)] . (4.8)
Finally, using (4.6) we can rewrite the maximization problem in (4.5) as
W (st) ≡ max
ẑt∈[0,z]
{
ρ˜t+1 (st + bt)
[∫ z
ẑt
(z − ẑt) dG (z)
]}
, (4.9)
subject to (4.7). The optimal contract problem is now boiled down to the choice of a
single variable ẑt. This problem, however, may not be concave. This means it is possible
to have multiple solutions to this problem which will then give rise to a multiplicity of
optimal loan contract. To avoid this, we impose the following additional condition on the
distribution function G (·) .4
Assumption A1
For any z ∈ [0, z] , G′ (z) + zG′′ (z) > 0.
Our first proposition provides a set of conditions under which a unique optimal loan
contract with interior threshold value, i.e., ẑt ∈ (0, z) , exists. We focus on contracts
4This assumption is satisfied by any distribution function of the following form: G (z) = (z/z)θ , for all
z ∈ [0, z] , with θ > 0. A uniform distribution over the range [0, z] corresponds to the case when θ = 1.
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with interior threshold value for the following reasons: If ẑt = 0 then auditing will never
occur. It follows from (4.6) and (4.7) that both borrowing and repayment are zero, i.e.,
bt = 0 and Qt (·) ≡ 0. Intuitively, this means the bank will not lend to the entrepreneur
if there is no chance to monitor the project return. On the other hand, a contract with
ẑt = z means that the bank will monitor the investment project in all possible states. It
follows from (4.6) that all the realized output of the project will be forfeited by the bank,
leaving the entrepreneur with zero payoff. Since the entrepreneur can always choose to
deposit their savings in the bank, such a contract will not be accepted by any rational
entrepreneur. An equilibrium with either one of these contract will thus leave no role for
financial intermediation. The conditions in Proposition 4.2.1 ensure that these extreme
and uninteresting cases will not occur. The proofs of this and other propositions can be
found in Appendix B.
Proposition 4.2.1. Suppose Rt+1 > 0, ρ˜t+1 > 0 and st > 0. Suppose Assumption A1
is satisfied. Then a unique optimal loan contract with interior threshold value ẑt ∈ (0, z)
exists if and only if (1− λ)E (z) < Rt+1/ρ˜t+1 < E (z) . The threshold value ẑt is uniquely
determined by
Rt+1 = H (ẑt) ρ˜t+1, (4.10)
where H : [0, z]→ R+ is defined by
H (x) = J (x) +
J ′ (x)
[∫ z
x (z − x) dG (z)
]
1−G (x) . (4.11)
According to (4.10), the cutoff level for auditing is determined by four factors: (i) the
bank’s outside return Rt+1, (ii) the gross return from physical capital (net of deprecia-
tion) ρ˜t+1, (iii) the costs of verification as captured by λ, and (iv) the distribution of the
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productivity shocks. Substituting (4.10) into (4.7) gives
bt =
[
J (ẑt)
H (ẑt)− J (ẑt)
]
st. (4.12)
This equation shows that the entrepreneur’s financial leverage (defined as the ratio between
total borrowing and his own asset) under the optimal contract is endogenously determined
by (i) the threshold value ẑt, (ii) the costs of verification as captured by λ, and (iii) the
distribution of the productivity shocks. Our next proposition explains how changes in
Rt+1, ρ˜t+1 and λ would affect ẑt and the entrepreneur’s leverage.
Proposition 4.2.2. Suppose the conditions in Proposition 4.2.1 are satisfied.
(i) Holding other things constant, an increase in the ratio Rt+1/ρ˜t+1 will lower the
cutoff value ẑt and the entrepreneur’s financial leverage.
(ii) Holding other things constant, an increase in λ will lower the cutoff value ẑt and the
entrepreneur’s financial leverage.
The intuitions of these results are as follows. Holding other things constant, a higher
value ofRt+1 means that the bank now faces a greater opportunity cost of business lending.
Thus, it will provide fewer loans to the entrepreneur. Fewer lending also means that the
agency problem involved in the loan contract is now alleviated. As a result, the bank
will choose to monitor the investment project less frequently (i.e., a lower value of ẑt) in
order to cut back on the verification costs. A similar mechanism is in place when there is
either a decline in ρ˜t+1 or an increase in λ. The former lowers the expected return from
the investment project, while the latter directly raises the costs of verification. Both of
these changes will discourage the bank from lending to the entrepreneur.
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4.2.4.2 Bank Competition for Deposits
Following Allen and Gale (2004) and Boyd, De Nicolo` and Jalal (2009), we assume
that banks engage in Cournot competition in the deposit market.5 Specifically, in each
period, each bank chooses the amount of deposits that it would accept, taking as given
the choices made by its rivals and the depositors’ saving decisions. The bank then uses
the deposits to make business loans to the entrepreneurs.
Let ζi,t be the amount of deposits chosen by bank i ∈ {1, 2, ...,M} at time t. The total
amount of deposits chosen by all M banks at time t is thus
∑M
i=1 ζi,t. Given these choices
and the depositors’ decision rules in (4.2), the deposit market at time t clears when
M∑
i=1
ζi,t = (1− α)Nt
 β 1σR 1σ−1t+1
1 + β
1
σR
1
σ
−1
t+1
wt.
This equation implicitly defines a relationship between
∑M
i=1 ζi,t and the deposit return
that clears the deposit market. Formally, this relationship is given by
Rt+1 ≡ Γt
(
M∑
i=1
ζi,t
)
= β
1
σ−1
[
(1− α)Ntwt∑M
i=1 ζi,t
− 1
] σ
σ−1
.
The function Γt (·) is often referred to as the inverse supply function of deposits. Note
that this function is strictly increasing if and only if the depositor’s IES is greater than
unity (i.e., σ < 1). In the following analysis, we will restrict our attention to the case
when the inverse supply function is strictly increasing.
An individual bank’s profit maximization problem at time t is given by
max
ζi,t
{
Rt+1ζi,t − Γt
(
M∑
i=1
ζi,t
)
ζi,t
}
, (4.13)
5In Section 3, we consider an extended model with Cournot competition in both the loan market and
the deposit market.
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subject to ζi,t ≥ 0, where Rt+1 is the bank’s return from the optimal loan contract. The
first-order necessary condition for this problem is
Rt+1 − Γt
(
M∑
i=1
ζi,t
)
≤ Γ′t
(
M∑
i=1
ζi,t
)
ζi,t, (4.14)
with equality holds if ζi,t > 0.
6 Since the banks in this economy are identical in all regards,
it is natural to consider a symmetric equilibrium. Specifically, a symmetric Cournot
equilibrium with interior solution is one in which all banks choose to accept the same
positive amount of deposits in every period, i.e., ζi,t = ζt > 0 for all t. The quantity ζt
and the deposit return Rt+1 in this type of equilibrium are determined by
Rt+1 = β
1
σ−1
[
(1− α)Ntwt
Mζt
− 1
] σ
σ−1
, (4.15)
Rt+1 − Γt
(
Mζt
)
= Γ′t
(
Mζt
)
ζt. (4.16)
4.2.5 Equilibrium
Given the total number of banks M ≥ 1 and the initial value of capital K0 >
0, an equilibrium of this economy consists of sequences of allocations for the depos-
itors {cy,t, co,t+1, dt}∞t=0 , allocations for the entrepreneurs {st, c˜o,t+1 (z)}∞t=0 , aggregate
inputs in final good production {Kt, Lt}∞t=0 , factor prices {wt, ρt}∞t=0 , loan contracts
{Qt (·) , bt, ẑt}∞t=0 , and other financial market variables
{Rt+1, Rt+1, ζt}∞t=0 such that the
following conditions are satisfied for all t ≥ 0,
(i) Given wt and Rt+1, the allocation {cy,t, co,t+1, dt} is optimal for the depositors in
generation t.
6As is evident from (4.13), a bank will choose to have ζi,t > 0 if and only if the return that it can obtain
from business lending (Rt+1) is no less than the return that it offers to the depositors (Rt+1) . According
to (4.14), this can happen only when Γt (·) is increasing.
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(ii) All young entrepreneurs will invest their labor income in the investment project,
i.e., st = wt. Their state-contingent consumption in the old age is determined
by the difference between the project return and the repayment, i.e., c˜o,t+1 (z) =
ρ˜t+1 (st + bt) max {(z − ẑt) , 0} , for all z ∈ [0, z] .
(iii) Given wt and ρt, the inputs {Kt, Lt} solve the final-good producer’s problem at time
t.
(iv) Given Rt+1 and ρ˜t+1, {Qt (·) , bt, ẑt} is the optimal loan contract, i.e., (4.6), (4.10)
and (4.12) are satisfied.
(v) Given wt and Rt+1, the deposit market variables
(
ζt, Rt+1
)
are determined in a
symmetric Cournot equilibrium, i.e., (4.15) and (4.16) are satisfied.
(vi) All markets clear, so that Lt = Nt, αNtdt = Mζt and
Kt+1 = αNt
∫ z
0
(st + bt) zdG (z) = αNt (st + bt)E (z) . (4.17)
Equation (4.17) states that aggregate capital at time t+1 is formed by aggregating the
output of all the investment projects. Define kt ≡ Kt/Nt. Using wt = (1− φ) kφt , st = wt
and (4.12), we can obtain
kt+1 =
α (1− φ)E (z)
1 + n
[
H (ẑt)
H (ẑt)− J (ẑt)
]
kφt . (4.18)
This equation shows how the provisions in the optimal loan contract will affect the accu-
mulation of physical capital. In equilibrium, all the deposits received by the banks will be
lent to the entrepreneurs as business loans, so that
(1− α)Nt
 β 1σR 1σ−1t+1
1 + β
1
σR
1
σ
−1
t+1
wt = αNtbt. (4.19)
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4.2.5.1 Stationary Equilibrium
A stationary equilibrium of this economy can be summarized by a set of positive real
numbers (k∗, ẑ∗,R∗, R∗) , which represent the per-worker amount of capital, the cutoff
level for auditing, the return from interbank loan, and the deposit return in a steady
state, respectively. These values are completely characterized by the following equations
k∗ =
α (1− φ)E (z)
1 + n
[
H (ẑ∗)
H (ẑ∗)− J (ẑ∗)
]
(k∗)φ , (4.20)
β
1
σ (R∗)
1
σ
−1
1 + β
1
σ (R∗)
1
σ
−1 =
α
1− α
[
J (ẑ∗)
H (ẑ∗)− J (ẑ∗)
]
, (4.21)
R∗ =
[
1− δ + φ (k∗)φ−1
]
H (ẑ∗) , (4.22)
R∗ = R∗
{
1 +
σ
(1− σ)M
[
1 + β
1
σ (R∗)
1
σ
−1
]}
. (4.23)
Equations (4.20)-(4.22) are the steady-state version of (4.18), (4.19) and (4.10), respec-
tively. The formal derivation of (4.23) can be found in Appendix B. Proposition 4.2.3
provides the conditions under which a unique stationary equilibrium exists.
Proposition 4.2.3. Suppose Assumption A1 is satisfied. Suppose σ < 1 so that the
inverse supply curve of deposits is strictly increasing. Then a unique stationary equilibrium
of this economy exists for any M ≥ 1.
We now consider the effects of an increase in M on the stationary equilibrium. To
put this in context, consider two economies that are identical in all aspects, except the
number of banks in their financial market. Let Mj ≥ 1 be the number of banks in economy
j ∈ {1, 2} and let
(
k∗j , ẑ
∗
j ,R∗j , R∗j
)
be the unique stationary equilibrium in this economy.
Our next proposition provides a comparison of these two equilibria.
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Proposition 4.2.4. Suppose the conditions in Proposition 4.2.3 are satisfied. Then M1 >
M2 implies k
∗
1 > k
∗
2, ẑ
∗
1 > ẑ
∗
2 , R∗1 < R∗2 and R∗1 > R∗2. In addition, the entrepreneur’s
financial leverage is higher in the economy with more banks.
The interpretation of this result is as follows. An increase in M means that there
is now more competition in the deposit market. This lowers the market power enjoyed
by each bank and reduces their ability to extract profits from their deposit operations.
Specifically, the intensified competition will drive up the deposit return (R∗) and lower
the bank’s outside option (R∗) . In the limit where M is infinite, the two returns will be
exactly identical, i.e., R∗ = R∗, and the zero-profit condition for the banks will prevail. In
this case, both the loan market and the deposit market are perfectly competitive, and the
choices made by a single bank will have no effect on the market outcomes. An increase
in the competition for deposits will also affect the lending operations of the banks. In
particular, the decline in R∗ means that the banks now face a lower opportunity cost
of business lending. This raises the entrepreneurs’ financial leverage, and increases the
investment in physical capital. But at the same time, the increase in borrowing will also
aggravate the agency problem involved in the loan contract. As a result, the banks will
monitor the investment projects more frequently (i.e., an increase in ẑ∗).
4.3 An Extended Model
We now extend the baseline model to allow for Cournot competition among banks in
both the loan market and the deposit market. Let ψi,t and ζi,t be the amount of loans and
deposits chosen by bank i ∈ {1, 2, ...,M} at time t. Similar to Section 2.4.2, the inverse
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supply function of deposits is given by
Rt+1 ≡ Γt
(
M∑
i=1
ζi,t
)
= β
1
σ−1
[
(1− α)Ntwt∑M
i=1 ζi,t
− 1
] σ
σ−1
.
We again focus on the case when Γt (·) is strictly increasing, i.e., when σ < 1.
The deposits received by the banks will be used to provide loans to the entrepreneurs.
The optimal loan contract is determined as follows: As before, a loan contract between
an entrepreneur and one of the banks, say bank i, will have to specify (i) the amount of
borrowing bi,t ≥ 0, (ii) a repayment schedule Qi,t : [0, z] → R+, and (iii) a set of states
under which auditing would occur, Ai,t. The repayment in all possible states must be
affordable by the entrepreneur, i.e.,
Qi,t (z) ≤ ρ˜t+1 (st + bi,t) z, for all z ∈ [0, z] .
The loan contract will guarantee the bank an expected return that is no less than R˜t+1
for each unit of borrowing, so that∫ z
0
Qi,t (z) dG (z)− λρ˜t+1 (st + bi,t)
∫
Ai,t
zdG (z) ≥ R˜t+1bi,t.
We will refer to R˜t+1 as the loan return to the bank. Finally, competition in the loan
market means that all banks will ask for the same return and that the contact must be
one that maximizes the entrepreneur’s expected return after repayment.
Following the same steps as in Section 2.4.1, we can show that the optimal loan contract
will again take the form of a standard debt contract with a unique cutoff value ẑi,t. Under
the conditions in Proposition 4.2.1, this value is determined by
R˜t+1 = H (ẑi,t) ρ˜t+1, (4.24)
and the amount of borrowing is
bi,t =
[
J (ẑi,t)
H (ẑi,t)− J (ẑi,t)
]
st. (4.25)
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Equations (4.24) and (4.25) have two important implications: First, when facing the same
value of
(
R˜t+1, ρ˜t+1, st
)
, all the banks will draft the same contract with the entrepreneurs,
i.e., ẑi,t = ẑt and bi,t = bt for all i ∈ {1, 2, ...,M} . Second, the above equations implicitly
define a relationship between the demand for loans by an individual entrepreneur and
the loan return to the banks. It is straightforward to show that the demand for loans is
strictly decreasing in R˜t+1.
Given the banks’ choices (ψ1,t, ..., ψM,t) and the entrepreneur’s demand for loans, the
loan market at time t clears when
M∑
i=1
ψi,t =
[
J (ẑt)
H (ẑt)− J (ẑt)
]
αNtst.
Using this and (4.24), we can define (again implicitly) the inverse demand function for
loans,
R˜t+1 = Ωt
(
M∑
i=1
ψi,t
)
.
The inverse demand function is continuously differentiable and strictly decreasing, i.e.,
Ω′t (·) < 0.
An individual bank’s profit maximization problem is now given by
max
ψi,t,ζi,t
{
Ωt
(
M∑
i=1
ψi,t
)
ψi,t − Γt
(
M∑
i=1
ζi,t
)
ζi,t
}
subject to the capacity constraint: ζi,t ≥ ψi,t ≥ 0. This constraint states that both loan-
s and deposits must be non-negative and that the banks cannot lend out more than
the amount of deposits received. Since the total liabilities owed by each bank, i.e.,
Γt
(∑M
i=1 ζi,t
)
ζi,t, is strictly increasing ζi,t, it is never optimal for the bank to have an
excess of deposits, i.e., ζi,t > ψi,t. Thus, the capacity constraint is always binding. Any
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solution of the bank’s problem must satisfy the first-order necessary condition
Ωt
(
M∑
i=1
ψi,t
)
+ Ω′t
(
M∑
i=1
ψi,t
)
ψi,t = Γt
(
M∑
i=1
ζi,t
)
+ Γ′t
(
M∑
i=1
ζi,t
)
ζi,t. (4.26)
The second term on both sides of (4.26) represents the bank’s market power in the loan
market and the deposit market. Specifically, by choosing the quantity of loans and deposit-
s, the bank can affect the loan return and the deposit return that clears these markets.
In a symmetric Cournot equilibrium, all banks choose the same amount of loans and
deposits in every period, i.e., ψi,t = ψt and ζi,t = ζt for all t. Such an equilibrium is
completely characterized by
Rt+1 = β
1
σ−1
[
(1− α)Ntwt
Mζt
− 1
] σ
σ−1
,
R˜t+1 + Ω′t
(
Mψt
)
ψt = Rt+1 + Γ
′
t
(
Mζt
)
ζt,
and ψt = ζt.
The other parts of the economy are the same as in the baseline model and are thus
not repeated. A stationary equilibrium of the extended model can be summarized by a
set of positive real numbers
(
k∗, ẑ∗, R˜∗, R∗
)
, which solves the following equations:
k∗ =
α (1− φ)E (z)
1 + n
[
H (ẑ∗)
H (ẑ∗)− J (ẑ∗)
]
(k∗)φ , (4.27)
β
1
σ (R∗)
1
σ
−1
1 + β
1
σ (R∗)
1
σ
−1 =
α
1− α
[
J (ẑ∗)
H (ẑ∗)− J (ẑ∗)
]
, (4.28)
R˜∗ =
[
1− δ + φ (k∗)φ−1
]
H (ẑ∗) , (4.29)
R˜∗
[
1 +
1
M
H ′ (ẑ∗)
H (ẑ∗)
L (ẑ∗)
L′ (ẑ∗)
]
= R∗
{
1 +
σ
(1− σ)M
[
1 + β
1
σ (R∗)
1
σ
−1
]}
, (4.30)
where L (ẑ∗) ≡ J (ẑ∗) / [H (ẑ∗)− J (ẑ∗)] is the entrepreneur’s financial leverage under the
optimal contract. Note that (4.27)-(4.29) are essentially the same as (4.20)-(4.22) in the
baseline model. Equation (4.30) is a modification of (4.23), which takes into account the
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banks’ market power in the loan market. A formal derivation of this equation can be
found in Appendix B.
4.4 Numerical Examples
We now provide some numerical examples to illustrate the effects of IES (1/σ) , the
costs of verification (as captured by λ), the intensity of bank competition (as captured
by M) and the share of entrepreneurs (α) on the steady-state values (k∗, ẑ∗,R∗, R∗) .
Suppose one model period takes 30 years. Set the annual subjective discount factor to
0.9750 and the annual employment growth rate to 1.6%. This latter is based on the
average annual growth rate of US employment over the period 1953-2008. Then we have
β = (0.9750)30 = 0.4678 and n = (1.0160)30 − 1 = 0.6099. We also set φ = 0.33 so that
capital’s share of income is about one-third, and the annual depreciation rate of physical
capital to 5% so that δ = 1 − (1− 0.05)30 = 0.78. The idiosyncractic productivity shock
is assumed to be uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 10] . We then solve for the
steady states under different combinations of (λ,M, σ, α) in the following examples. In
the benchmark scenario, as represented by the blue solid line in each figure, we set M = 10,
σ = 0.75 and α = 0.05. Both the baseline model and the extended model are solved using
these parameter values. It turns out that the numerical results obtained from these models
are almost identical. This happens because the only difference between the steady state
of the two models is the relation between R and R, [see equation (4.23) and (4.30)] and
the numerical value of
[
1 + 1M
H′(ẑ∗)
H(ẑ∗)
L(ẑ∗)
L′(ẑ∗)
]
in equation (4.30) is very close to one under
the chosen parameter values. Hence, equations (4.23) and (4.30) are essentially identical.
For this reason, we only report the results from the baseline model.
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Figure 4.1: Changing the Intensity of Bank Competition.
Figure 1 shows the value of (k∗, ẑ∗,R∗, R∗) under different combinations of λ and M.
Holding M constant, all four variables decrease as the verification cost λ grows larger. A
higher value of λ means that the banks now face a greater cost of business lending. This
will discourage them from lending to the entrepreneurs. Fewer lending means that the
information asymmetry problem involved in the loan contract is now less severe. Hence,
the bank will choose to audit the investment project less frequently and the threshold
value ẑ∗ declines. On the other hand, with less lending banks desire less deposit and thus
pay less return to savers. Another consequence is that a larger wedge is generated between
the capital return and that received by banks, since increase in monitoring difficulty has
granted the entrepreneurs more advantage in the borrowing. As for the effect of bank
competition, it is shown that more competition (i.e., an increase in M) induces more
saving, hence more capital accumulation. Meanwhile, the deposit return is driven up and
the overall interest rate charged to the entrepreneurs is driven down. These results are
consistent with the predictions of Proposition 4.2.4.
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Figure 4.2: Changing the Depositor’s IES.
Figure 2 shows the steady state values under different combinations of λ and σ. These
results depend crucially on the effects of σ on the depositor’s saving rate Σ (σ,R) . S-
traightforward differentiation yields
∂Σ (σ,R)
∂σ
= −
(
β
1
σR
1
σ
−1
)
ln (βR)
σ2
(
1 + β
1
σR
1
σ
−1
)2 ≷ 0 iff βR ≶ 1.
Thus, when the deposit return R∗ is high (as in the case when λ is low), an increase
in σ will lower the depositors’ willingness to save. As a result, fewer resources will be
invested in capital accumulation and k∗ decreases as a result. The opposite is true when
the deposit return R∗ is low. In this case, the depositors will save more when σ increases.
These changes, however, have very little impact on the loan contract. In particular,
the threshold value ẑ∗, the loan return R∗ and the entrepreneur’s financial leverage (not
shown here) are not sensitive to changes in σ. Another thing worth mentioning is that the
interest rate gap (R∗ −R∗) increases ubiquitously as σ increases. Intuitively, an increase
in σ (which is equivalent to a decrease in IES) means that the supply of deposit is now
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less responsible to changes in R∗. This inelastic supply enables the banks to offer a lower
deposit return and extract more profits by widening the gap between R∗ and R∗.
Figure 4.3: Changing the Population Share of Entrepreneurs.
Figure 3 depicts the steady state values under different (λ−α) schemes. The effects of
verification cost are consistent with the first two examples. In general, an increase in the
number of entrepreneurs will push up the steady state capital and drives down both R∗ and
R∗. The positive relation between capital and the share of entrepreneurs is due to the fact
that given the same wage rate and factor price, risk neutral entrepreneurs save more than
risk adverse depositors. Thus when the economy has a larger share of entrepreneurs, the
total saving (eventually in the form of capital) will increase too. It can also be considered
from the fact that all the capital is produced through entrepreneur’s investment projects.
When their share reduces, there are fewer channel to transfer savings into capital. The
outcome of R∗ and R∗ can be derived from equation (4.21). According to this equation,
individual’s deposit supply curve is not affected by α. But an increase in α will affect
the demand for deposits in two opposite ways. First, the value of α/ (1− α) increases as
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the population share of entrepreneurs increases. In words, this means each depositor now
faces a large number of entrepreneurs asking for loans. This is a positive drive of demand.
Second, an increase in α also indirectly reduces each entrepreneur’s desire for loans and
the leverage ratio, since the economy now has more capital accumulation, thus less capital
return. This further gives a larger R/ρ˜ ratio and consequently, a lower threshold ẑ∗ and
lower leverage ratio. In this numerical example, the negative effect on demand dominates
and we see a decrease in R∗ when the number of entrepreneurs increases.
4.5 Conclusion
This paper has presented a dynamic general equilibrium model to examine the impli-
cation of bank competition on capital accumulation. The relationship between financial
development and the real economy in the presence of CSV problem has been largely ex-
plored in the macroeconomic literature. The financial market in these works, however,
is either perfect competitive or monopolistic. A less extreme market structure has not
been thoroughly examined yet. On the other hand, bank size and distribution are well
studied in the finance research, but most of the works are abstract from consideration of
the aggregate economy. Our paper fills in this gap in the literature by combining the two
lines of research.
In this model, financial market consists of Cournot competitive banks who intermediate
credit between savers and entrepreneurs and have power in both the saving and the loan
market. By affecting the deposit rate as well as the price of loans, the banks control the
volume of saving and borrowing, which jointly determine the capital level. In addition, due
to the asymmetric information problem, the monitoring intensity is positively associated
with leverage ratio. Therefore, when the financial market becomes less concentrated,
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a higher volume of credits will be issued to entrepreneurs, which leads to more capital
investment. Meanwhile, banks demand more active monitoring that will aggravate the
inefficiency. Within this framework, we also analyze how the severity of asymmetry, the
share of entrepreneurs or the intertemporal elasticity of substitution affect the capital
accumulation. The results show a negative, positive and mixing effect respectively.
*
Appendix A
Chapter 3
I: Mathematical Derivations
Post-Crash Equilibrium
In this section, we provide a detailed characterization of a post-crash equilibrium. S-
ince the consumer’s problem in the post-crash economy is standard, the derivations of
(4.3)-(4.5) are omitted. The dynamical system in (4.13)-(4.14) can be derived as follows.
In equilibrium, the market wage rate and the gross return from physical capital are deter-
mined by ŵt = (1− α) K̂αt L̂−αt and R̂t = αK̂α−1t L̂1−αt , respectively. Using these, we can
obtain
ŵt l̂t =
1− α
α
R̂tk̂t, (A.1)
ŵt = (1− α)
(
α
R̂t
) α
1−α
, (A.2)
l̂t =
(
R̂t
α
) 1
1−α
k̂t. (A.3)
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where k̂t ≡ K̂t/Nt and l̂t ≡ L̂t/Nt. Then we can rewrite the capital market clearing
condition as
(1 + n) k̂t+1 =
 β 1σ
(
R̂t+1
) 1
σ
−1
1 + β
1
σ
(
R̂t+1
) 1
σ
−1
 ŵt l̂t ≡ Σ(R̂t+1) ŵt l̂t.
Substituting (A.2) into the above expression gives (4.13). Next, substituting (A.2) and
(A.3) into (4.4) gives(
R̂t
α
) 1
1−α
k̂t = A
− 1
σ+ψ
[
1 + β
1
σ
(
R̂t+1
) 1
σ
−1] σσ+ψ [
(1− α)
(
α
R̂t
) α
1−α
] 1−σ
σ+ψ
⇒
(
R̂t
α
)η
k̂t =
[
(1− α)1−σ
A
] 1
σ+ψ [
1 + β
1
σ
(
R̂t+1
) 1
σ
−1] σσ+ψ
, (A.4)
where
η ≡ 1
1− α +
α
1− α
1− σ
σ + ψ
=
ψ + α+ σ (1− α)
(1− α) (σ + ψ) > 0,
η − 1 = α
1− α
1 + ψ
σ + ψ
> 0,
for any σ > 0. Equation (4.14) can be obtained by rearranging terms in (A.4).
Local Analysis
We now explore the local stability property of the unique bubbleless steady state under
different values of σ. To achieve this, we consider a linearized version of the dynamical
system in (4.13)-(4.14). First, taking logarithms of both sides of these equations gives
ln k̂t+1 − ln Σ
(
R̂t+1
)
= ln
[
1− α
α (1 + n)
]
+ ln R̂t + ln k̂t,
ln
αη
[
(1− α)1−σ
A
] 1
σ+ψ
+ σσ + ψ ln
(
1 + β
1
σ R̂
1
σ
−1
t+1
)
= η ln R̂t + ln k̂t.
Next, taking the first-order Taylor expansion of these equations around
(
k̂∗, R̂∗
)
gives
k̂t+1 −
R̂∗Σ′
(
R̂∗
)
Σ
(
R̂∗
) R̂t+1 = k̂t + R̂t,
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1− σ
σ + ψ
 β 1σ
(
R̂∗
) 1
σ
−1
1 + β
1
σ
(
R̂∗
) 1
σ
−1
 R̂t+1 = k̂t + ηR̂t,
where k̂t ≡
(
k̂t − k̂∗
)
/k̂∗ and R̂t ≡
(
R̂t − R̂∗
)
/R̂∗ represent the percentage deviations of
k̂t and R̂t from their steady-state values. Finally, rewrite the linearized system in matrix
form  1 b12
0 b22

︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
 k̂t+1
R̂t+1
 =
 1 1
1 η

 k̂t
R̂t
 , (A.5)
where
b12 = −
R̂∗Σ′
(
R̂∗
)
Σ
(
R̂∗
) = (1− 1
σ
)[
1 + β
1
σ
(
R̂∗
) 1
σ
−1]−1
,
b22 =
1− σ
σ + ψ
 β 1σ
(
R̂∗
) 1
σ
−1
1 + β
1
σ
(
R̂∗
) 1
σ
−1
 .
The inverse of the matrix B is given by
B−1 =
1
b22
 b22 −b12
0 1
 .
Using this, we can rewrite (A.5) as k̂t+1
R̂t+1
 = 1b22
 b22 − b12 b22 − ηb12
1 η

︸ ︷︷ ︸
J
 k̂t
R̂t
 , (A.6)
where J is the Jacobian matrix of the linearized system. Let ρ1 and ρ2 be the characteristic
roots of the linearized system. These can be obtained by solving
Ξ (ρ) ≡ ρ2 −
(
1− b12
b22
+
η
b22
)
ρ+
η − 1
b22
= 0.
If σ < 1, then we have b12 < 0 and b22 > 0 which imply
Ξ (ρ) > 0, for all ρ < 0,
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Ξ (0) =
η − 1
b22
> 0, as η > 1,
Ξ (1) ≡ 1−
(
1− b12
b22
+
η
b22
)
+
η − 1
b22
=
b12 − 1
b22
< 0.
The last two inequalities ensure that one of the characteristic roots can be found within
the interval of (0, 1) . This rules out the possibility of complex roots. Since Ξ (ρ) > 0 for
all ρ ≤ 0, both ρ1 and ρ2 must be strictly positive. Finally, if both ρ1 and ρ2 are within
the interval of (0, 1] , then we should have Ξ (1) ≥ 0 instead. Thus, the second root must
be greater than one. This proves that the system in (A.6) is saddle-path stable within the
neighborhood of the bubbleless steady state when σ < 1. Proposition 4.2.2 strengthens
this result by showing that this steady state is globally saddle-path stable when σ < 1.
If σ > 1, then we have b12 ∈ (0, 1) and b22 < 0 which imply Ξ (0) < 0 < Ξ (1) . Hence,
one of the characteristic roots must lie within the interval of (0, 1) . Since the product of
roots Ξ (0) is strictly negative, the second characteristic root must be strictly negative.
If Ξ (−1) > 0, then the second root must lie within the interval of (−1, 0) . In this case,
the linearized system has two stable roots which means the bubbleless steady state is a
sink. If Ξ (−1) < 0, then the absolute magnitude of the second root is greater than one.
In this case, the bubbleless steady state is again saddle-path stable. The value of Ξ (−1)
is determined by
Ξ (−1) = 2− b12
b22︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
+
2η − 1
b22︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
.
Unfortunately, the sign of this expression cannot be readily determined. Hence, the local
stability property of the post-crash equilibrium is ambiguous when σ > 1.
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Bubbly Equilibrium
In this section, we will provide a detailed characterization of the consumer’s problem
in the pre-crash economy, and present the derivation of (3.18)-(4.20). Substituting (4.6)
and (4.7) into the consumer’s expected lifetime utility gives
L = (wtlt − st − ptmt)
1−σ
1− σ −A
l1+ψt
1 + ψ
+β
q (Rt+1st + pt+1mt)1−σ + (1− q)
(
R̂t+1st
)1−σ
1− σ
 .
The first-order conditions with respect to st, mt and lt are, respectively, given by
(wtlt − st − ptmt)−σ = β
[
qRt+1 (Rt+1st + pt+1mt)
−σ + (1− q) R̂t+1
(
R̂t+1st
)−σ]
,
(A.7)
(wtlt − st − ptmt)−σ = βq
(
pt+1
pt
)
(Rt+1st + pt+1mt)
−σ , (A.8)
Alψt = wt (wtlt − st − ptmt)−σ . (A.9)
Here we only focus on interior solutions of mt. Define pit+1 ≡ pt+1/pt. Combining (A.1)
and (A.8) gives
qpit+1 (Rt+1st + pt+1mt)
−σ = qRt+1 (Rt+1st + pt+1mt)−σ + (1− q) R̂t+1
(
R̂t+1st
)−σ
,
⇒ q (pit+1 −Rt+1) (Rt+1st + pt+1mt)−σ = (1− q) R̂t+1
(
R̂t+1st
)−σ
,
⇒ Rt+1st + pt+1mt =
[
q (pit+1 −Rt+1)
(1− q) R̂t+1
] 1
σ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ωt+1
(
R̂t+1st
)
, (A.10)
⇒ mt = 1
pt+1
(
Ωt+1R̂t+1 −Rt+1
)
st,
⇒ st + ptmt =
[
1 +
Rt+1
pit+1
(Λt+1 − 1)
]
st, (A.11)
where Λt+1 ≡ Ωt+1R̂t+1/Rt+1. Using (A.8) and (A.10), we can get
Rt+1st + pt+1mt = (βqpit+1)
1
σ (wtlt − st − ptmt) = Ωt+1R̂t+1st,
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⇒ st =
 (βqpit+1)
1
σ
Ωt+1R̂t+1 + (βqpit+1)
1
σ
[
1 + Rt+1pit+1 (Λt+1 − 1)
]
wtlt. (A.12)
Using this and (A.6), we can obtain
cy,t = wtlt − (st + ptmt) =
 Ωt+1R̂t+1Ωt+1R̂t+1 + (βqpit+1) 1σ [1 + Rt+1pit+1 (Λt+1 − 1)]
wtlt. (A.13)
Substituting this into (A.9) and rearranging terms give
Alψ+σt = (wt)
1−σ
Ωt+1R̂t+1 + (βqpit+1)
1
σ
[
1 + Rt+1pit+1 (Λt+1 − 1)
]
Ωt+1R̂t+1

σ
. (A.14)
These equations characterize the optimal choice of cy,t, lt, st and mt before the crash.
We now provide the derivation of (3.18)-(4.20). In equilibrium, the market for physical
capital clears when
(1 + n) kt+1 = st =
 (βqpit+1)
1
σ
Ωt+1R̂t+1 + (βqpit+1)
1
σ
[
1 + Rt+1pit+1 (Λt+1 − 1)
]
wtlt
⇒ (1 + n) kt+1 =
 (βqpit+1)
1
σ
Ωt+1R̂t+1 + (βqpit+1)
1
σ
[
1 + Rt+1pit+1 (Λt+1 − 1)
]

(
1− α
α
)
Rtkt.
(A.15)
The second line uses the fact that αwtlt = (1− α)Rtkt. Combining (A.7) and (A.9) gives
Alψ+σt = (wt)
1−σ
{
(βqpit+1)
1
σ
Ωt+1R̂t+1
[
1− α
α (1 + n)
]
Rtkt
kt+1
}σ
. (A.16)
Upon setting kt+1 = kt = k
∗, Rt = Rt+1 = R∗, R̂t+1 = R̂∗0 and pit+1 = 1 + n, equation
(A.9) becomes
1 + n =
 [βq (1 + n)]
1
σ
Ω∗R̂∗0 + [βq (1 + n)]
1
σ
[
1 + R
∗
1+n (Λ
∗ − 1)
]

(
1− α
α
)
R∗, (A.17)
where Λ∗ = Ω∗R̂∗0/R∗. Rearranging terms in this equation gives
1 +
[
1 + (βq)−
1
σ (1 + n)1−
1
σ
](Ω∗R̂∗0
1 + n
)
=
1
α
R∗
1 + n
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⇒ 1 +
[
1 + (βq)−
1
σ (1 + n)1−
1
σ
]( q
1− q
) 1
σ
(
R̂∗0
1 + n
)1− 1
σ (
1− R
∗
1 + n
) 1
σ
=
1
α
R∗
1 + n
,
which is equation (3.18) in the text. Similarly, after substituting the stationarity conditions
into (A.11), we can obtain
A (l∗)ψ+σ = (w∗)1−σ
{
[βq (1 + n)]
1
σ
Ω∗R̂∗0
(
1− α
α
)
R∗
1 + n
}σ
.
Equation (4.18) follows immediately from this equation. Equations (4.17) and (4.19) can
be obtained from (4.2). Finally, equation (4.20) can be obtained from (4.8).
Define θ∗ ≡ R∗/(1 + n). Then we can rewrite (3.18) as
Ψ (θ∗) ≡ 1 +
[
1 + (βq)−
1
σ (1 + n)1−
1
σ
]( q
1− q
) 1
σ
(
R̂∗0
1 + n
)1− 1
σ
(1− θ∗) 1σ = θ
∗
α
. (A.18)
For any R̂∗0 > 0 and σ > 0, Ψ : [0, 1] → R+ is a strictly decreasing function that satisfies
Ψ (0) > 0 and Ψ (1) = 1 < 1/α. Meanwhile, the right-hand side of the above equation is a
straight line that passes through the origin and 1/α (when θ∗ = 1). Thus, for any R̂∗0 > 0
and σ > 0, there exists a unique θ∗ ∈ (0, 1) that solves (A.12). Once θ∗ is determined, the
value of {k∗, w∗, l∗, a∗} can be uniquely determined using (4.17)-(4.20).
Propensity to Consumer When Young
Using (A.13), we can get
c∗y
w∗l∗
=
Ω∗R̂∗0
Ω∗R̂∗0 + β
1
σ [q (1 + n)]
1
σ
[
1 + R
∗
1+n (Λ
∗ − 1)
]
=
{
1 + β
1
σ
[q (1 + n)]
1
σ
Ω∗R̂∗0
[
1 +
R∗
1 + n
(Λ∗ − 1)
]}−1
≡
[
1 + β
1
σ (ρ∗)
1
σ
−1
]−1
,
where ρ∗ is the certainty equivalent return defined in the text. An alternative expression for
the propensity to consume can be obtained as follows. First, rewrite the above expression
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as
c∗y
w∗l∗
=
Ω∗R̂∗0
[βq (1 + n)]
1
σ
 [βq (1 + n)]
1
σ
Ω∗R̂∗0 + [βq (1 + n)]
1
σ
[
1 + R
∗
1+n (Λ
∗ − 1)
]
 . (A.19)
Using (A.13), we can obtain
[βq (1 + n)]
1
σ
Ω∗R̂∗0 + [βq (1 + n)]
1
σ
[
1 + R
∗
1+n (Λ
∗ − 1)
] = α (1 + n)
1− α
1
R∗
.
Substituting this into (A.10) gives
c∗y
w∗l∗
=
Ω∗R̂∗0
[βq (1 + n)]
1
σ
[
α (1 + n)
1− α
1
R∗
]
.
On the other hand, in the bubbleless steady state, we have
ĉ∗y
ŵ∗ l̂∗
=
[
1 + β
1
σ
(
R̂∗
) 1
σ
−1]−1
=
α (1 + n)
1− α
(
βR̂∗
)− 1
σ
.
The second equality follows from (4.15). Hence, we have
ĉ∗y
ŵ∗ l̂∗
>
c∗y
w∗l∗
⇔
(
R̂∗
)− 1
σ
>
Ω∗R̂∗0
[q (1 + n)]
1
σ
1
R∗
⇔
[
q (1 + n)
R̂∗
] 1
σ
>
Ω∗R̂∗0
R∗
.
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II: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4.2.1
In any bubbleless steady state, we have k̂t+1 = k̂t = k̂
∗ and R̂t+1 = R̂t = R̂∗ for all t.
Substituting these into (4.5) and rearranging terms gives
Γ
(
R̂∗
)
≡
β
1
σ
(
R̂∗
) 1
σ
1 + β
1
σ
(
R̂∗
) 1
σ
−1 =
(1 + n)α
1− α . (A.20)
Substituting the steady state conditions into (4.14) and rearranging terms gives (4.16).
Note that the function Γ : R+ → R+ defined in (A.20) is continuously differentiable and
satisfies Γ (0) = 0. Straightforward differentiation gives
Γ′
(
R̂
)
=
β
1
σ R̂
1
σ
−1
(
1
σ + β
1
σ R̂
1
σ
−1
)
(
1 + β
1
σ R̂
1
σ
−1
)2 > 0, for any σ > 0.
Hence, there exists a unique value of R̂∗ > 0 that solves (A.20). Using (4.16), one can
obtain a unique value of k̂∗ > 0. This establishes the existence and uniqueness of bubbleless
steady state.
Proof of Proposition 4.2.2
First, consider the case when σ = 1. Equations (4.13) and (4.14) now become
k̂t+1 =
1− α
α (1 + n)
(
β
1 + β
)
R̂tk̂t, and R̂
1
1−α
t k̂t = α
1
1−α
(
1 + β
A
) 1
1+ψ
. (A.21)
Combining the two gives
k̂t+1 =
β (1− α)
(1 + β) (1 + n)
(
1 + β
A
) 1−α
1+ψ
k̂αt .
Since α ∈ (0, 1) , there exists a unique non-trivial steady state k̂∗ > 0 which is globally
stable. The second equation in (A.21) can be rewritten as
R̂t = α
(
1 + β
A
) 1−α
1+ψ (
k̂t
)α−1 ≡ Φ(k̂t) ,
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where Φ (·) is a strictly decreasing function.
Next, consider the case when σ < 1. To prove that the bubbleless steady state is
globally saddle-path stable, we will use the same “phase diagram” approach as in Tirole
(1985) and Weil (1987). To start, define a function F : R+ → R+ according to
F (R) = αη
[
(1− α)1−σ
A
] 1
σ+ψ (
1 + β
1
σR
1
σ
−1
) σ
σ+ψ
R−η. (A.22)
Note that the unique bubbleless steady state must satisfy k̂∗ = F
(
R̂∗
)
. Taking the
logarithm of both sides of (A.22) and differentiating the resultant expression with respect
to R gives
RF ′ (R)
F (R) =
1− σ
σ + ψ
(
β
1
σR
1
σ
−1
1 + β
1
σR
1
σ
−1 − η˜
)
=
1− σ
σ + ψ
[Σ (R)− η˜] ,
where η˜ ≡ (σ + ψ) η/ (1− σ) and Σ (·) is the function defined in (4.5). There are two
possible scenarios: (i) η˜ ≥ 1 and (ii) η˜ < 1. Since Σ (·) is strictly increasing and bounded
above by one, in the first scenario we have F ′ (R) < 0 for all R ≥ 0, limR→0F (R) = +∞
and limR→∞F (R) = 0. In the second scenario, F (·) is a U-shaped function. Figures
B1 and B2 provide a graphical illustration of these two scenarios. In both diagrams, the
function F (·) and the vertical line representing R = R̂∗ divide the (R, k)-space into four
quadrants:
Q1 ≡
{
(R, k) : k ≤ F (R) , R ≤ R̂∗, and (R, k) 6=
(
R̂∗, k̂∗
)}
,
Q2 ≡
{
(R, k) : k > F (R) and R < R̂∗
}
,
Q3 ≡
{
(R, k) : k ≥ F (R) , R ≥ R̂∗, and (R, k) 6=
(
R̂∗, k̂∗
)}
,
Q4 ≡
{
(R, k) : k < F (R) and R > R̂∗
}
.
The rest of the proof is divided into a number of intermediate steps. These steps are valid
both when η˜ ≥ 1 and when η˜ < 1.
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Step 1
For any initial value
(
R̂T , k̂T
)
> 0, there exists a unique sequence
{
R̂T+1, k̂T+1, R̂T+2, k̂T+2, ...
}
that solves the dynamical system in (4.13)-(4.14). Whether this is part of a non-stationary
bubbleless equilibrium depends on the location of
(
R̂T , k̂T
)
on the (R, k)-space. A so-
lution
{
R̂T+1, k̂T+1, R̂T+2, k̂T+2, ...
}
is said to originate from Qn if
(
R̂T , k̂T
)
∈ Qn, for
n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} . In the first step of the proof, it is shown that any solution that originates
from Q1 or Q3 cannot be part of a bubbleless equilibrium.
Suppose
(
R̂t, k̂t
)
is in Q1 for some t ≥ T. This means either (i) k̂t < F
(
R̂t
)
and
R̂t ≤ R̂∗, or (ii) k̂t = F
(
R̂t
)
and R̂t < R̂
∗. First consider the case when k̂t < F
(
R̂t
)
and
R̂t ≤ R̂∗. Using (4.14), we can obtain
R̂ηt k̂t = α
η
[
(1− α)1−σ
A
] 1
σ+ψ [
1 + β
1
σ
(
R̂t+1
) 1
σ
−1] σσ+ψ
< αη
[
(1− α)1−σ
A
] 1
σ+ψ [
1 + β
1
σ
(
R̂t
) 1
σ
−1] σσ+ψ
,
which implies R̂t+1 < R̂t ≤ R̂∗. Recall that the function Σ (·) defined in (4.5) is strictly
increasing when σ < 1. Then it follows from (4.13) that
k̂t+1 =
1− α
α (1 + n)
Σ
(
R̂t+1
)
R̂tk̂t
<
1− α
α (1 + n)
Σ
(
R̂∗
)
R̂tk̂t ≤ 1− α
α (1 + n)
Σ
(
R̂∗
)
R̂∗k̂t = k̂t.
The last equality follows from equation (4.15). This result implies k̂t+1 < k̂t < F
(
R̂t
)
<
F
(
R̂t+1
)
. Next, consider the case when k̂t = F
(
R̂t
)
and R̂t < R̂
∗. Equation (4.14)
and k̂t = F
(
R̂t
)
together imply R̂t+1 = R̂t < R̂
∗. This, together with (4.13), implies
k̂t+1 < k̂t < F
(
R̂t
)
= F
(
R̂t+1
)
. This proves the following: Any solution that originates
from Q1 is a strictly decreasing sequence and is confined in Q1, i.e.,
(
R̂t, k̂t
)
∈ Q1 for all
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t ≥ T. Since both k̂t and R̂t are strictly decreasing over time, in the long run we will have
either k̂t = 0 or R̂t = 0, which cannot happen in equilibrium.
Using a similar argument, we can show that any solution that originates from Q3 is
a strictly increasing sequence and is confined in Q3. Using the young consumer’s budget
constraint and the capital market clearing condition, we can obtain the following condition
ŝt =
k̂t+1
1 + n
< ŵt l̂t ≤ ŵt = (1− α)
(
α
R̂t
) α
1−α
.
Obviously, this will be violated at some point if both k̂t and R̂t are strictly increasing
over time. Hence, any solution that originates from Q3 cannot be part of a bubbleless
equilibrium.
Step 2
We now show that any solution that originates from Q2 will never enter Q4, i.e.,(
R̂T , k̂T
)
∈ Q2 implies
(
R̂t, k̂t
)
/∈ Q4, for all t > T ; likewise, any solution that originates
from Q4 will never enter Q2.
Suppose
(
R̂t, k̂t
)
is in Q2 for some t ≥ T. Then we have
R̂ηt k̂t = α
η
[
(1− α)1−σ
A
] 1
σ+ψ [
1 + β
1
σ
(
R̂t+1
) 1
σ
−1] σσ+ψ
> αη
[
(1− α)1−σ
A
] 1
σ+ψ [
1 + β
1
σ
(
R̂t
) 1
σ
−1] σσ+ψ
,
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which implies R̂t+1 > R̂t. Suppose the contrary that
(
R̂t+1, k̂t+1
)
is in Q4, so that R̂t+1 >
R̂∗ > R̂t and k̂t+1 < F
(
R̂t+1
)
. Then, using (4.13) we can get
R̂t+1k̂t+1 =
1− α
α (1 + n)
 β 1σ
(
R̂t+1
) 1
σ
1 + β
1
σ
(
R̂t+1
) 1
σ
−1
 R̂tk̂t
>
1− α
α (1 + n)
 β 1σ
(
R̂∗
) 1
σ
1 + β
1
σ
(
R̂∗
) 1
σ
−1
 R̂tk̂t = R̂tk̂t. (A.23)
The second line uses the fact that Σ (·) is strictly increasing and R̂t+1 > R̂∗. The last
equality follows from the steady-state condition in (4.15). Since η > 1, we also have
R̂η−1t+1 > R̂
η−1
t . This, together with (4.14) and (A.23), implies
R̂ηt+1k̂t+1 > R̂
η
t k̂t = α
η
[
(1− α)1−σ
A
] 1
σ+ψ [
1 + β
1
σ
(
R̂t+1
) 1
σ
−1] σσ+ψ
⇒ k̂t+1 > F
(
R̂t+1
)
,
which gives rise to a contradiction. Hence, any solution that originates from Q2 will never
enter Q4. Using similar arguments, we can show that any solution that originates from Q4
will never enter Q2.
Step 3
Consider a solution that originates from Q2. As shown in Step 2,
(
R̂T , k̂T
)
∈ Q2
implies R̂T+1 > R̂T . If R̂T+1 ≥ R̂∗, then the economy is in Q3 at time T + 1 and by the
results in Step 1, we know that R̂t will diverge to infinity in the long run. If R̂T+1 < R̂
∗,
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then using (4.13) we can obtain
k̂T+1 =
1− α
α (1 + n)
 β 1σ
(
R̂T+1
) 1
σ
−1
1 + β
1
σ
(
R̂T+1
) 1
σ
−1
 R̂T k̂T
<
1− α
α (1 + n)
 β 1σ
(
R̂∗
) 1
σ
1 + β
1
σ
(
R̂∗
) 1
σ
−1
 k̂T = k̂T .
There are two possible scenarios: First, if R̂T+1 < R̂
∗ and k̂T+1 ≤ F
(
R̂T+1
)
, then the
economy is in Q1 at time T+1. By the results in Step 1, we know that all subsequent values
of R̂t will be strictly less than R̂
∗. Second, if R̂T+1 < R̂∗ and F
(
R̂T+1
)
< k̂T+1, then that
means the economy remains in Q2 at time T + 1. In addition, we have R̂T+1 > R̂T and
k̂T > k̂T+1 which means the economy is now getting closer to the steady state
(
R̂∗, k̂∗
)
.
Thus, any solution that originates from Q2 has three possible fates: (i) It will enter Q3 at
some point and R̂t will then diverge to infinity. (ii) It will enter Q1 at some point and
R̂t will be strictly less than R̂
∗ afterward. (iii) It will converge to the bubbleless steady
state. For reasons explained above, the first two types of solutions cannot be part of
an equilibrium. Hence, a solution originating from Q2 is an equilibrium path only if it
converges to the steady state
(
R̂∗, k̂∗
)
. The above argument also shows that, along the
convergent path, k̂t is decreasing towards k̂
∗ while R̂t is increasing towards R̂∗.
Using a similar argument, we can show that any solution originating from Q4 is an
equilibrium path only if it converges to the steady state
(
R̂∗, k̂∗
)
, and that along the
convergent path, k̂t is increasing towards k̂
∗ while R̂t is decreasing towards R̂∗.
Step 4
We now establish the uniqueness of saddle path. Fix k̂T > 0. Suppose the contrary
that there exists two saddle paths, denoted by
{
R̂′t, k̂′t
}∞
t=T
and
{
R̂′′t , k̂′′t
}∞
t=T
, with k̂′T =
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k̂′′T = k̂T and R̂
′
T > R̂
′′
T > 0. By the results in Step 3, we know that limt→∞R̂
′
t = lim
t→∞R̂
′′
t = R̂
∗.
Substituting k̂′T = k̂
′′
T and R̂
′
T > R̂
′′
T into (4.14) gives
(
R̂′T
R̂′′T
)η
=
1 + β 1σ
(
R̂′T+1
) 1
σ
−1
1 + β
1
σ
(
R̂′′T+1
) 1
σ
−1

σ
σ+ψ
> 1,
which implies R̂′T+1 > R̂
′′
T+1 > 0. Using (4.13), we can get
k̂′T+1
k̂′′T+1
=
Σ
(
R̂′T+1
)
Σ
(
R̂′′T+1
) R̂′T
R̂′′T
> 1.
Using (4.14) again, but now for t = T + 1, gives
(
R̂′T+1
R̂′′T+1
)η (
k̂′T+1
k̂′′T+1
)
=
1 + β 1σ
(
R̂′T+2
) 1
σ
−1
1 + β
1
σ
(
R̂′′T+2
) 1
σ
−1

σ
σ+ψ
> 1,
which implies R̂′T+2 > R̂
′′
T+2. By an induction argument, we can show that R̂
′
T+j > R̂
′′
T+j
implies k̂′T+j > k̂
′′
T+j , and R̂
′
T+j+1 > R̂
′′
T+j+1, for all j ≥ 1. The last result contradicts
lim
t→∞R̂
′
t = lim
t→∞R̂
′′
t = R̂
∗. Hence, we can rule out the possibility of multiple saddle paths.
In sum, we have shown that any equilibrium path that originates from a given value of
k̂T > 0 must be unique and converge to the bubbleless steady state. Hence, the dynamical
system in (4.13)-(4.14) is globally saddle-path stable. The one-to-one relationship between
R̂T and k̂T can be captured by a function Φ : R+ → R+. Since the saddle path is downward
sloping in the (R, k)-space, Φ (·) must be strictly decreasing. This completes the proof of
Proposition 4.2.2.
Proof of Proposition 4.2.3
In the post-crash economy, optimal labor supply is determined by (4.4). Setting σ = 1
gives l̂t =
(
1+β
A
) 1
1+ψ
for all t. In the pre-crash economy, optimal labor supply is determined
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by
Alψ+σt = (wt)
1−σ
Ωt+1R̂t+1 + (βqpit+1)
1
σ
[
1 + Rt+1pit+1 (Λt+1 − 1)
]
Ωt+1R̂t+1

σ
,
which is equation (A.7) in Appendix A, where
Ωt+1 ≡
[
q (pit+1 −Rt+1)
(1− q) R̂t+1
] 1
σ
and Λt+1 ≡ Ωt+1R̂t+1
Rt+1
.
When σ = 1, the right-hand side (RHS) of the above equation becomes
RHS = 1 +
(
Ωt+1R̂t+1
)−1
(βqpit+1)
[
1 +
Rt+1
pit+1
(Λt+1 − 1)
]
= 1 +
β (1− q)
pit+1 −Rt+1
(
pit+1 + Ωt+1R̂t+1 −Rt+1
)
= 1 +
β (1− q)
pit+1 −Rt+1
[
pit+1 −Rt+1 + q (pit+1 −Rt+1)
1− q
]
= 1 + β.
Hence, we have Alψ+1t = 1 + β for all t. The desired result follows immediately from this
expression. This completes the proof of Proposition 4.2.3.
Proof of Proposition 4.2.4
The main ideas of the proof are as follows. In any conditional bubbly steady state,
we have a∗ > 0 which is equivalent to Λ∗ > 1. This, together with σ < 1 and R∗ ≤ R̂∗,
implies two things: k∗ > k̂∗ and R̂∗0 ≡ Φ (k∗) > R̂∗. But as we have seen in Proposition
4.2.2, these two results cannot be both true which means we have reached a contradiction.
Hence, it must be the case that R∗ > R̂∗.
The main task of the proof is to verify the following two claims:
Claim #1
Suppose σ < 1 and Λ∗ > 1. Then R∗ ≤ R̂∗ implies l∗ > l̂∗ and k∗ > k̂∗.
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Claim #2
Suppose σ < 1 and Λ∗ > 1. Then R∗ ≤ R̂∗ implies R̂∗ < R̂∗0.
Proof of Claim #1
Suppose R∗ ≤ R̂∗ and l∗ > l̂∗ are both true. Then using (4.19), we can get
k∗ = l∗
( α
R∗
) 1
1−α
> l̂∗
(
α
R̂∗
) 1
1−α
= k̂∗.
Hence, it suffice to show that R∗ ≤ R̂∗ implies l∗ > l̂∗.
When evaluated in a recurring bubbly equilibrium, equation (A.7) becomes
A (l∗)ψ+σ = (w∗)1−σ
{
1 +
[βq (1 + n)]
1
σ
Ω∗R̂∗0
[
1 +
R∗
1 + n
(Λ∗ − 1)
]}σ
=
[
(1− α)
( α
R∗
) α
1−α
]1−σ{
1 +
[βq (1 + n)]
1
σ
Ω∗R̂∗0
[
1 +
R∗
1 + n
(Λ∗ − 1)
]}σ
.
On the other hand, the value of l̂∗ in the bubbleless steady state is determined by
A
(
l̂∗
)ψ+σ
=
[
(1− α)
(
α
R̂∗
) α
1−α
]1−σ [
1 + β
1
σ
(
R̂∗
) 1
σ
−1]σ
.
Combining the two gives
(
l∗
l̂∗
)ψ+σ
=
(
R̂∗
R∗
)α(1−σ)
1−α

1 + [βq(1+n)]
1
σ
Ω∗R̂∗0
[
1 + R
∗
1+n (Λ
∗ − 1)
]
1 + β
1
σ
(
R̂∗
) 1
σ
−1

σ
.
Since σ < 1 and R∗ ≤ R̂∗, we have
(
R̂∗/R∗
)α(1−σ)
1−α ≥ 1. Thus, it suffice to show that
[βq(1+n)]
1
σ
Ω∗R̂∗0
> β
1
σ
(
R̂∗
) 1
σ
−1
.
Define θ∗ ≡ R∗/ (1 + n) , θ̂∗0 ≡ R̂∗0/(1+n) and θ̂∗ ≡ R̂∗/(1+n). As shown in Proposition
4.2.1, the value of R̂∗ is determined by (4.15), which can be rewritten as
(
1− α
α
)
θ̂∗ = 1 + β−
1
σ (1 + n)1−
1
σ
(
θ̂∗
)1− 1
σ
. (A.24)
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On the other hand, the relationship between R∗ and R̂∗0 is characterized by (3.18), which
is derived from (A.13) in Appendix A. The latter can be rewritten as
(
1− α
α
)
θ∗ = 1 + θ∗ (Λ∗ − 1) + [βq (1 + n)]− 1σ Ω∗R̂∗0
= 1 + θ∗ (Λ∗ − 1) + β− 1σ q− 1σ (1 + n)1− 1σ Ω∗θ̂∗0. (A.25)
Combining (A.24) and (A.25) gives
(
1− α
α
)(
θ∗ − θ̂∗
)
= θ∗ (Λ∗ − 1) + β− 1σ (1 + n)1− 1σ
[
q−
1
σΩ∗θ̂∗0 −
(
θ̂∗
)1− 1
σ
]
. (A.26)
Under the conditions σ < 1, Λ∗ > 1 and R∗ ≤ R̂∗ (i.e., θ∗ ≤ θ̂∗), we can get
q−
1
σΩ∗θ̂∗0 <
(
θ̂∗
)1− 1
σ
(A.27)
⇔ q− 1σΩ∗
(
R̂∗0
1 + n
)
<
(
R̂∗
1 + n
)1− 1
σ
⇔ q− 1σΩ∗R̂∗0 <
(
R̂∗
)1− 1
σ
(1 + n)
1
σ
⇔
(
R̂∗
) 1
σ
−1
<
[q (1 + n)]
1
σ
Ω∗R̂∗0
.
This establishes Claim #1.
Proof of Claim #2
First, note that Λ∗ > 1 is true if and only if
q (1 + n) >
q + (1− q)(R̂∗0
R∗
)1−σR∗
⇔ q (1− θ
∗)
θ∗
> (1− q)
(
θ̂∗0
θ∗
)1−σ
. (A.28)
Next, rewrite (A.27) as
q−
1
σ
[
q (1− θ∗)
(1− q) θ̂∗0
] 1
σ
θ̂∗0 <
(
θ̂∗
)1− 1
σ
102
⇔ 1− θ∗ < (1− q)
(
θ̂∗0
θ̂∗
)1−σ
. (A.29)
Using (A.28) and (A.29), and the assumptions of θ∗ ≤ θ̂∗ and σ < 1, we can get
q (1− θ∗)
θ∗
> (1− q)
(
θ̂∗0
θ∗
)1−σ
≥ (1− q)
(
θ̂∗0
θ̂∗
)1−σ
> 1− θ∗,
which implies q > θ∗. Using (A.29) and q > θ∗, we can get
(1− q)
(
θ̂∗0
θ̂∗
)1−σ
> 1− θ∗ > 1− q ⇒ θ̂∗0 > θ̂∗.
This establishes Claim #2.
Appendix B
Chapter 4
I: Characterizing the Optimal Loan Contract
Throughout this section, we will assume that Rt+1 > 0, ρ˜t+1 > 0 and st > 0. We begin
by stating some of the basic properties of an optimal contract.
Property 1
Let z˜ (z) be the reported value of productivity when the true value is z. If verification
does not occur, i.e., z˜ (z) /∈ At, then the entrepreneur will always choose to report a value
that minimizes his repayment. Thus, the repayment is a constant whenever z˜ (z) /∈ At.
By the truthful reporting property, we have z˜ (z) = z for all z ∈ [0, z] . Hence, Qt (z) = qt
whenever z /∈ At.
Property 2
The repayment schedule Qt (z) is bounded above by qt for all z ∈ At. Suppose the
contrary that Qt (ẑ) > qt, for some ẑ ∈ At. Then an entrepreneur with true state ẑ ∈ At
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can lower his repayment to qt by reporting a value in At, which contradicts the truthful
reporting property.
Property 3
The bank’s participation constraint must hold with equality under any optimal con-
tract. Otherwise, it is possible to increase the entrepreneur’s expected payoff by lowering
the repayment in some states without violating the bank’s participation constraint.
We now establish the debt structure of the optimal contract. Specifically, we want to
show that the repayment schedule under any optimal contract with bt > 0 will take the
form in (4.6). Let {Q′t (·) , b′t, q′t} be an optimal contract with borrowing b′t > 0. Define
A′t = {z ∈ [0, z] : Q′t (z) ≤ q′t} and B′t = [0, z]− A′t. In particular, Q′t (·) and q′t are chosen
such that the bank’s participation constraint holds with equality, i.e.,
∫
A′t
[
Q′t (z)− λρ˜t+1
(
st + b
′
t
)
z
]
dG (z) + q′t
∫
B′t
dG (z) = Rt+1b
′
t. (A.1)
By the affordability condition, we have Q′t (z) ≤ ρ˜t+1 (st + b′t) z for all z ∈ [0, z] . Suppose
the contrary that strict inequality holds for some z ∈ A′t. Specifically, define the set St
according to
St =
{
z ∈ A′t : Q′t (z) < ρ˜t+1
(
st + b
′
t
)
z
}
and suppose St has positive mass under the distribution G (·) . Fix b′t > 0 and consider
another contract {Q′′t (z) , b′t, q′′t } with Q′′t (z) = ρ˜t+1z (st + b′t) for z ∈ A′′t , and
A′′t =
[
0,
q′′t
ρ˜t+1 (st + b′t)
]
.
The quantity q′′t is chosen so that the bank’s participation constraint is binding, i.e.,∫
A′′t
[
Q′′t (z)− λρ˜t+1
(
st + b
′
t
)
z
]
dG (z) + q′′t
∫
B′′t
dG (z) = Rt+1b
′
t, (A.2)
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where B′′t = [0, z]−A′′t . We now show that there exists at least one such q′′t in the interval
(0, q′t) .
First define a function Φt (x) according to
Φt (x) ≡
∫
A(x)
[
Q′′t (z)− λρ˜t+1
(
st + b
′
t
)
z
]
dG (z) + x
∫
Bt(x)
dG (z) ,
where
A (x) =
[
0,
x
ρ˜t+1 (st + b′t)
]
and B (x) = [0, z]−A (x) .
Since A (0) is an empty set, it follows that Φt (0) = 0 < Rt+1b
′
t. If x = q
′
t, then A (x) = A
′
t.
Since Q′′t (z) > Q′t (z) for all z ∈ St, we have
Φt
(
q′t
)
=
∫
A′t
[
Q′′t (z)− λρ˜t+1
(
st + b
′
t
)
z
]
dG (z) + q′t
∫
B′t
dG (z)
>
∫
A′t
[
Q′t (z)− λρ˜t+1
(
st + b
′
t
)
z
]
dG (z) + q′t
∫
B′t
dG (z) = Rt+1b
′
t.
Since Φt (·) is a continuous function, by the intermediate value theorem, there exists at
least one q′′t ∈ (0, q′t) that solves (A.2).
For any z ∈ A′′t , we have Q′t (z) ≤ Q′′t (z) = ρ˜t+1z (st + b′t) ≤ q′′t < q′t. Hence any z ∈ A′′t
also belongs to A′t. This proves that A′′t is a proper subset of A′t. Under {Q′t (z) , b′t, q′t} ,
the entrepreneur’s expected utility is given by
∫ z
0
ρ˜t+1
(
st + b
′
t
)
zdG (z)−
∫
A′t
Q′t (z) dG (z)− q′t
∫
B′t
dG (z) .
Under {Q′′t (z) , b′t, q′′t } , his expected utility is∫ z
0
ρ˜t+1
(
st + b
′
t
)
zdG (z)−
∫
A′′t
Q′′t (z) dG (z)− q′′t
∫
B′′t
dG (z) .
The difference between the two is
λρ˜t+1
(
st + b
′
t
) [∫
A′′t
zdG (z)−
∫
A′t
zdG (z)
]
.
106
Since z is a non-negative random variable and A′′t is a proper subset of A′t, we have∫
A′′t
zdG (z) <
∫
A′t
zdG (z) . This means the entrepreneur strictly prefers {Q′′t (z) , b′t, q′′t } to
{Q′t (z) , b′t, q′t} , which contradicts the assumption that {Q′t (z) , b′t, q′t} is optimal. Thus,
the repayment schedule under any optimal contract with bt > 0 will take the form in (4.6)
and there exists a unique threshold level ẑt ∈ [0, z] such that verification occurs whenever
z ≤ ẑt, i.e., At = [0, ẑt] . Using these results, we can rewrite the bank’s participation
constraint as
ρ˜t+1 (st + bt)
{
(1− λ)
∫ ẑt
0
zdG (z) + ẑt [1−G (ẑt)]
}
= Rt+1bt
⇒ J (ẑt) ρ˜t+1 (st + bt) = Rt+1bt, (A.3)
where J (·) is defined in the text. Likewise, we can also rewrite the entrepreneur’s expected
payoff as
ρ˜t+1 (st + bt)
[∫ z
ẑt
(z − ẑt) dG (z)
]
. (A.4)
Thus, the optimal contract problem involves choosing a threshold level ẑt so as to maximize
the expression in (A.4) subject to the bank’s participation constraint in (A.3).
Finally, we will derive the expression of borrowing in (4.7). Since J (0) = 0 and J (·)
is a continuous function, the following set {x ∈ [0, z] : Rt+1 > J (x) ρ˜t+1} must be non-
empty. We now show that any optimal threshold value ẑt must be chosen from this set.
Suppose the contrary that Rt+1 ≤ J (ẑt) ρ˜t+1. Then the bank’s participation constraint
implies Rt+1 (st + bt) ≤ J (ẑt) ρ˜t+1 (st + bt) = Rt+1bt, which contradicts bt > 0. Equation
(4.7) can be obtained by rearranging the terms in (A.3).
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II: Proofs and Derivations
Properties of J (·) and H (·)
Much of the results in this study depend crucially on the properties of two auxiliary
functions J (·) and H (·) , defined in (4.8) and (4.11), respectively. Thus, before we prove
the main results of this paper, we first describe the main properties of these functions.
The function J (·) is twice continuously differentiable, and has the following properties:
J (0) = 0, J (z) = (1− λ)E (z) > 0, and
J ′ (x) = 1−G (x)− λxG′ (x) , (A.5)
where J ′ (0) = 1 and J ′ (z) = −λzG′ (z) < 0. These properties imply that J (·) is a
non-monotonic function. In particular, the second-order derivative of J (·) is given by
J ′′ (x) = − [(1 + λ)G′ (x) + λxG′′ (x)] (A.6)
= −{G′ (x) + λ [G′ (x) + xG′′ (x)]} .
Since G (·) is assumed to be strictly increasing, we have G′ (x) > 0 for all x ∈ [0, z] . By
Assumption A1, we also have G′ (x) + xG′′ (x) > 0, for all x ∈ [0, z] . Hence, J ′′ (x) < 0
for all x ∈ [0, z] . This also implies that there exists a unique zm such that J (zm) > J (z)
for all other z ∈ [0, z] .
Next, we consider the function H (·) . Since J (0) = 0, and J ′ (0) = 1, we have H (0) =
E (z) > 0. We can also show that H (z) = J (z) = (1− λ)E (z) . To see this, note that
lim
x→z
J
′ (x)
[∫ z
x (z − x) dG (z)
]
1−G (x)
 = J ′ (z) limx→z
[∫ z
x zdG (z)
1−G (x) − x
]
= J ′ (z) lim
x→z
[−xG′ (x)
−G′ (x) − x
]
= 0.
The second equality is obtained by using L’Hospital’s rule. Hence, we have H (z) = J (z) .
Assumption A1 implies that H (·) is a strictly decreasing function. To see this, consider
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the first-order derivative of H (x) ,
H ′ (x) =
[∫ z
x (z − x) dG (z)
]
[1−G (x)]2
{
J ′′ (x) [1−G (x)] + J ′ (x)G′ (x)} .
Using (A.5) and (A.6), we can get
J ′′ (x) [1−G (x)] + J ′ (x)G′ (x) = −λ [G′ (x) + xG′′ (x)] [1−G (x)]− λx [G′ (x)]2 ,
which is strictly negative as G′ (x) + xG′′ (x) > 0, for all x ∈ [0, z] . Since J ′ (zm) = 0,
we have H (zm) = J (zm) . It is straightforward to show that H (z) ≷ J (z) if and only if
z ≶ zm. All these properties are summarized in Figure A1.
Proof of Proposition 4.2.1
Substituting (4.7) into the objective function in (4.9) gives
ẑt ≡ arg max
x∈[0,z)
 ρ˜t+1
[∫ z
x (z − x) dG (z)
]
Rt+1 − J (x) ρ˜t+1 Rt+1st
 .
The first-order necessary condition for this problem is given by
− [1−G (x)] +
ρ˜t+1
[∫ z
x (z − x) dG (z)
]
J ′ (x)
Rt+1 − J (x) ρ˜t+1

> 0 if ẑt = z,
= 0 if ẑt ∈ [0, z] ,
< 0 if ẑt = 0.
Using (4.11), we can simplify this to become
H (ẑt) ρ˜t+1 −Rt+1

> 0 if ẑt = z,
= 0 if ẑt ∈ [0, z] ,
< 0 if ẑt = 0.

. (A.7)
Under Assumption A1, the function H (·) is strictly decreasing from H (0) = E (z)
to H (z) = (1− λ)E (z) . Thus, a unique interior threshold value exists if and only if
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(1− λ)E (z) = H (z) < Rt+1/ρ˜t+1 < H (0) = E (z) . Finally, we show that the second-
order condition for maximization is satisfied at this unique value. Consider the function
Γt (x) ≡
[∫ z
x (z − x) dG (z)
]
Rt+1 − J (x) ρ˜t+1 .
Straightforward differentiation yields
Γ′t (x) =
− [1−G (x)]
Rt+1 − J (x) ρ˜t+1 +
J ′ (x) ρ˜t+1
[∫ z
x (z − x) dG (z)
]
[Rt+1 − J (x) ρ˜t+1]2
,
Γ′′t (x) =
G′ (x)
Rt+1 − J (x) ρ˜t+1 −
2J ′ (x) ρ˜t+1 [1−G (x)]
[Rt+1 − J (x) ρ˜t+1]2
+
J ′′ (x) ρ˜t+1
[∫ z
x (z − x) dG (z)
]
[Rt+1 − J (x) ρ˜t+1]2
+
2 [J ′ (x) ρ˜t+1]2
[∫ z
x (z − x) dG (z)
]
[Rt+1 − J (x) ρ˜t+1]3
. (A.8)
When these derivatives are evaluated at the unique solution of Rt+1 = H (ẑt) ρ˜t+1, we
have
[1−G (ẑt)]
Rt+1 − J (ẑt) ρ˜t+1 =
J ′ (ẑt) ρ˜t+1
[∫ z
ẑt
(z − ẑt) dG (z)
]
[Rt+1 − J (ẑt) ρ˜t+1]2
.
This means the second and the fourth expressions in (A.8) can be canceled out. Hence,
we can get
Γ′′t (ẑt) =
1
Rt+1 − J (ẑt) ρ˜t+1
G′ (ẑt) + J
′′ (ẑt) ρ˜t+1
[∫ z
ẑt
(z − ẑt) dG (z)
]
Rt+1 − J (ẑt) ρ˜t+1
 .
Using (4.11) and Rt+1 = H (ẑt) ρ˜t+1, we can get
Rt+1 − J (ẑt) ρ˜t+1 = [H (ẑt)− J (ẑt)] ρ˜t+1 =
J ′ (ẑt) ρ˜t+1
[∫ z
ẑt
(z − ẑt) dG (z)
]
1−G (ẑt)
⇒
J ′′ (ẑt) ρ˜t+1
[∫ z
ẑt
(z − ẑt) dG (z)
]
Rt+1 − J (ẑt) ρ˜t+1 =
J ′′ (ẑt) [1−G (ẑt)]
J ′ (ẑt)
.
Using this, we can obtain
Γ′′t (ẑt) =
J ′′ (ẑt) [1−G (ẑt)] +G′ (ẑt) J ′ (ẑt)
[Rt+1 − J (ẑt) ρ˜t+1] J ′ (ẑt) .
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Note that we have come across the expression {J ′′ (x) [1−G (x)] +G′ (x) J ′ (x)} when
evaluating the derivative of H (·) . In particular, we have shown that this expression is
strictly negative for any x ∈ [0, z] under Assumption A1. In addition, J ′ (ẑt) > 0 for
any ẑt > 0. Hence, we have Γ
′′
t (ẑt) < 0 meaning that the second-order condition for
maximization is satisfied. This completes the proof of Proposition 4.2.1.
Proof of Proposition 4.2.2
Part (i)
Since H (·) is strictly decreasing under Assumption A1, it follows immediately from
(4.10) that an increase in Rt+1/ρ˜t+1 will lower the threshold value ẑt. Next, let L (ẑt) be
the entrepreneur’s financial leverage under the optimal contract, i.e.,
L (ẑt) = J (ẑt)
H (ẑt)− J (ẑt) .
Straightforward differentiation yields
L′ (ẑt) = J
′ (ẑt)H (ẑt)− J (ẑt)H ′ (ẑt)
[H (ẑt)− J (ẑt)]2
> 0.
The above expression is strictly positive because (i) the function H (·) is strictly decreasing
under Assumption A1, and (ii) H (ẑt) > J (ẑt) if and only if ẑt < zm, which means
J ′ (ẑt) > 0.
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Part (ii)
In order to highlight the dependence on λ, we will rewrite (4.10) asRt+1 = H (ẑt;λ) ρ˜t+1
and the financial leverage as L (ẑt;λ) . Define Hz (z;λ) and Hλ (z;λ) as the partial deriva-
tive of H (·) with respect to z and λ. Similar define Lz (z;λ) and Lλ (z;λ) . Under As-
sumption A1, Hz (z;λ) < 0 for all z ∈ [0, z] . Straightforward differentiation yields
Hλ (z;λ) = −
∫ z
0
xdG (x)− zG′ (z) < 0, for all z ∈ [0, z] .
Hence, we have
dẑt
dλ
= −Hλ (ẑt;λ)
Hz (ẑt;λ)
< 0.
This means an increase in λ will lower the threshold level of auditing. Next, we turn to
the effects on L (ẑt;λ) which are given by
dL (ẑt;λ)
dλ
= Lz (ẑt;λ) dẑt
dλ
+ Lλ (ẑt;λ)
=
H (ẑt;λ)
[H (ẑt;λ)− J (ẑt;λ)]2
[
−Jz (ẑt;λ) Hλ (ẑt;λ)
Hz (ẑt;λ)
+ Jλ (ẑt;λ)
]
.
The above expressions is negative because: (i) Jz (ẑt;λ) > 0, (ii) −Hλ (ẑt;λ) /Hz (ẑt;λ) <
0, and (iii) Jλ (ẑt;λ) = −
∫ ẑt
0 xdG (x) < 0. This completes the proof of Proposition 4.2.2.
Derivation of Equation (4.23)
Recall the definition of the inverse supply function of deposits,
Γt
(
M∑
i=1
ζi,t
)
= β
1
σ−1
[
(1− α)Ntwt∑M
i=1 ζi,t
− 1
] σ
σ−1
.
Straightforward differentiation yields
Γ′t
(
M∑
i=1
ζi,t
)
= β
1
σ−1
(
σ
1− σ
)[
(1− α)Ntwt∑M
i=1 ζi,t
− 1
] 1
σ−1 (1− α)Ntwt(∑M
i=1 ζi,t
)2 . (A.9)
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In equilibrium, we have
M∑
i=1
ζi,t = Mζt = (1− α)Ntdt = (1− α)Nt
 β 1σR 1σ−1t+1
1 + β
1
σR
1
σ
−1
t+1
wt
⇒ (1− α)Ntwt∑M
i=1 ζi,t
=
1 + β
1
σR
1
σ
−1
t+1
β
1
σR
1
σ
−1
t+1
.
Substituting these into (A.9) gives
Γ′t
(
Mζt
)
=
σ
1− σ
[
Rt+1
(
1 + β
1
σR
1
σ
−1
t+1
)]
1
Mζt
.
Using this, we can rewrite (4.16) as
Rt+1 = Rt+1
[
1 +
σ
(1− σ)M
(
1 + β
1
σR
1
σ
−1
t+1
)]
.
Equation (4.23) is the steady-state version of this equation.
Proof of Proposition 4.2.3
First, rewrite (4.20) as
1 + n
α (1− φ)E (z) [H (ẑ
∗)− J (ẑ∗)] = H (ẑ∗) (k∗)φ−1 .
Substituting this into (4.22) gives
R∗ =
[
φ (1 + n)
α (1− φ)E (z) + 1− δ
]
H (ẑ∗)−
[
φ (1 + n)
α (1− φ)E (z)
]
J (ẑ∗) ≡ ∆ (ẑ∗) . (A.10)
Recall that under Assumption A1, the function J (·) is strictly concave. Thus, there exists
a unique value zm ∈ (0, z) such that H (zm) = J (zm) > J (z) for all other z. Since any
interior threshold value ẑt would imply J
′ (ẑt) > 0, we can focus on the range [0, zm] . The
newly defined function ∆ : [0, zm]→ R has the following properties:
∆ (0) =
[
(1 + n)φ
α (1− φ)E (z) + 1− δ
]
H (0) =
(1 + n)φ
α (1− φ) + (1− δ)E (z) > 0,
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∆ (zm) = (1− δ) J (zm) ,
∆′ (ẑ) =
[
(1 + n)φ
α (1− φ)E (z) + 1− δ
]
H ′ (ẑ)−
[
(1 + n)φ
α (1− φ)E (z)
]
J ′ (ẑ) .
Since H ′ (ẑ) < 0 for all ẑ ∈ [0, z] and J ′ (ẑ) ≥ 0 for all z ∈ [0, zm] , we have ∆′ (ẑ) < 0 over
the range [0, zm] .
Next, using (4.21) we can obtain
β
1
σ (R∗)
1
σ
−1 =
αJ (ẑ∗)
(1− α)H (ẑ∗)− J (ẑ∗)
which in turn implies
1 + β
1
σ (R∗)
1
σ
−1 =
(1− α) [H (ẑ∗)− J (ẑ∗)]
(1− α)H (ẑ∗)− J (ẑ∗) ≡ Ψ (ẑ
∗) , (A.11)
and
R∗ =
(
β
ασ
) 1
σ−1
[
(1− α) H (ẑ
∗)
J (ẑ∗)
− 1
] σ
σ−1
≡ Λ (ẑ∗) . (A.12)
Using these auxiliary functions, we can rewrite (4.23) as
R∗ = Λ (ẑ∗)
[
1 +
σ
(1− σ)MΨ (ẑ
∗)
]
≡ Θ (ẑ∗) . (A.13)
Note that both Ψ (·) and Λ (·) are positive only for values of z that satisfy (1− α)H (z) >
J (z) . Since H (0) > J (0) = 0, H (zm) = J (zm) = Jmax, and H
′ (ẑ) < 0 ≤ J ′ (ẑ) for all
z ∈ [0, zm] , there exists a unique value, denoted by ze ∈ (0, zm) , such that (1− α)H (ze) =
J (ze) ,and (1− α)H (z) > J (z) , for all z ∈ [0, ze) . Thus, both of these functions are
defined over the interval [0, ze] . Since
lim
z→0
[
(1− α) H (z)
J (z)
− 1
]
→ +∞ and lim
z→ze
[
(1− α) H (z)
J (z)
− 1
]
→ 0,
we have
lim
z→0
Ψ (z) = 0 and lim
z→ze
Ψ (z) = +∞,
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lim
z→0
Λ (z) = 0 and lim
z→ze
Λ (z) = +∞, when σ < 1.
Finally, we want to show that both Ψ (·) and Λ (·) are strictly increasing functions. This
property depends crucially on the shape of H (·) /J (·) . Using (4.11), we can get
H (x)
J (x)
= 1 +
J ′ (x)
[∫ z
x (z − x) dG (z)
]
J (x) [1−G (x)] .
Straightforward differentiation gives
d
dx
[
H (x)
J (x)
]
=
J ′′ (x)
[∫ z
x (z − x) dG (z)
]
J (x) [1−G (x)] −
J ′ (x)
J (x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
−
[J ′ (x)]2
[∫ z
x (z − x) dG (z)
]
[J (x)]2 [1−G (x)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
+
J ′ (x)
[∫ z
x (z − x) dG (z)
]
J (x) [1−G (x)]2 G
′ (x) .
The first and the last term can be combined to become
J ′′ (x)
[∫ z
x (z − x) dG (z)
]
J (x) [1−G (x)] +
J ′ (x)
[∫ z
x (z − x) dG (z)
]
J (x) [1−G (x)]2 G
′ (x)
=
[∫ z
x (z − x) dG (z)
]
J (x) [1−G (x)]2
{
J ′′ (x) [1−G (x)] + J ′ (x)G′ (x)} < 0.
The expression inside the curly brackets is strictly negative under Assumption A1. Hence,
H (x) /J (x) is strictly decreasing over the range (0, ze) . It follows immediately from (A.12)
that Λ (·) is strictly increasing when σ < 1. Next, consider Ψ (·) which can be expressed
as
Ψ (x) =
(1− α)
[
H(x)
J(x) − 1
]
(1− α) H(x)J(x) − 1
.
The first-order derivative of this function is given by
Ψ′ (x) =
−α (1− α)[
(1− α) H(x)J(x) − 1
]2 ddx
[
H (x)
J (x)
]
> 0.
These results together imply that Θ (·) is a strictly increasing that approaches zero as z
tends to 0, and is infinitely large when z is close to ze.
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We are now ready to establish the existence and uniqueness result. Any steady-state
ẑ∗ is a solution of the equation ∆ (ẑ∗) = Θ (ẑ∗) . As we have shown above, when σ < 1,
we have
∆ (0) > Θ (0) = 0 and ∆ (ze) < Θ (ze) = +∞.
Since both ∆ (·) and Θ (·) are continuous functions, by the intermediate value theorem,
the equation ∆ (ẑ∗) = Θ (ẑ∗) has at least one solution within the interval (0, ze) . Since
∆ (·) is strictly decreasing and Θ (·) is strictly increasing, there exists at most one such
solution. Once the value of ẑ∗ is determined, the value of R∗, R∗ and k∗ can be uniquely
determined using (A.12), (A.13) and (4.20). This completes the proof of Proposition 4.2.3.
Proof of Proposition 4.2.4
The proof of this result is built upon the proof of Proposition 4.2.3. Recall that the
threshold value for auditing (ẑ∗) is uniquely determined by
∆ (ẑ∗) = Λ (ẑ∗)
[
1 +
σ
(1− σ)MΨ (ẑ
∗)
]
≡ Θ (ẑ∗;M) .
The notation Θ (ẑ∗;M) highlights the dependence of this function on M. Note that none of
the auxiliary functions, ∆ (·) , Λ (·) and Ψ (·) , are affected by M. From the above equation,
it is obviously that Θ (z;M1) < Θ (z;M2) for all z ∈ (0, ze) when M1 > M2. This in turn
implies ẑ∗1 > ẑ∗2 . A graphical illustration of this result is shown in Figure A2.
Since ∆ (·) is strictly decreasing, it follows from (A.10) that R∗1 = ∆ (ẑ∗1) < ∆ (ẑ∗2) =
R∗2. Similarly, since Λ (·) is strictly increasing, it follows from (A.12) that R∗1 = Λ (ẑ∗1) >
Λ (ẑ∗2) = R∗2. Next, rewrite (4.20) as
k∗j =
[
α (1− φ)E (z)
1 + n
] 1
1−φ
1 +
H
(
ẑ∗j
)
J
(
ẑ∗j
) − 1
−1

1
1−φ
.
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Since H (x) /J (x) is strictly decreasing for all x ∈ (0, ze) , it follows from the above
equation that k∗1 > k∗2. Finally, we compare the entrepreneur’s financial leverage in these
two economies. As shown in the proof of Proposition 4.2.2, financial leverage L (ẑt) is
strictly increasing in ẑt. Thus, we have L (ẑ∗1) > L (ẑ∗2) . This completes the proof of
Proposition 4.2.4.
Derivation of Equation (4.30)
The right side of equation (4.30) is the same as that of (4.23), thus here we will focus
on the left side of the equation. According to (4.25), an entrepreneur’s demand for loans
is given by bt = L (ẑt) st, where L (ẑt) is the financial leverage. The total demand for loans
is thus given by
Bt = αNtbt = L (ẑt)αNtwt, (A.14)
after imposing st = wt. The threshold value ẑt is determined by (4.24), which implies
dẑt =
[
1
ρ˜t+1H ′ (ẑt)
]
dR˜t+1.
Totally differentiate (A.14) with respect to Bt and ẑt gives
dBt = αNtwtL′ (ẑt) dẑt.
Combining these two expressions gives
dR˜t+1
dBt = Ω
′
t (Bt) =
ρ˜t+1
αNtwt
H ′ (ẑt)
L′ (ẑt) =
R˜t+1
αNtwt
H ′ (ẑt)
H (ẑt)
1
L′ (ẑt) .
The last equality follows from (4.24). Thus, in equilibrium, we have
Ωt
(
Mψt
)
+ Ω′t
(
Mψt
)
ψt = R˜t+1 +
[
R˜t+1
αNtwt
H ′ (ẑt)
H (ẑt)
1
L′ (ẑt)
] [
1
M
L (ẑt)αNtwt
]
,
117
where we have used the loan market clearing condition: Mψt = L (ẑt)αNtwt. This ex-
pression can be simplified to become
R˜t+1
[
1 +
1
M
H ′ (ẑt)
H (ẑt)
L (ẑt)
L′ (ẑt)
]
,
which is the left-hand side of (4.30).
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